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WHEN SOCIAL ENTERPRISES FAIL
JONATHAN BROWN*
I. INTRODUCTION
WHAT becomes of a social enterprise that fails?  In the extensivescholarship produced on recently developed “social enterprise” le-
gal entity forms, the issue of financial failure receives little attention.1  Per-
haps this should be of no surprise: bankruptcy is often perceived to be a
“gloomy and depressing subject,” whereas social enterprise is a decidedly
feel-good one.2  The concept of a business organization that blends for-
profit enterprise with a social mission has been heralded as both a new way
of doing business and a new business form.3  A majority of states have
recently adopted legislation enabling the creation of “benefit corpora-
tions,” “public benefit corporations,” or “social purpose corporations,”
business organization forms that require the pursuit of socially-beneficial
objectives to accompany the pursuit of pecuniary gain.4  And an increas-
ing number of businesses have chosen to adopt these forms, including
high-profile brands like Patagonia, King Arthur Flour, Kickstarter,
Method, and Plum Organics.5
But as an increasing number of businesses elect to operate as social
enterprises, it is only a matter of time before some of them fail.  When
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for the helpful comments of Barry Adler, Ian Ayres, Barbara Bezdek, Patience
Crowder, Bradley Scott Friedman, Michael Gentithes, Anika Singh Lemar, Alec
Ostrow, Jean Koh Peters, Alan Schwartz, and Steve Wizner.  Special thanks go to
Jonathan Endean, who provided outstanding research assistance.
1. There is no single, universally-accepted definition of the term “social enter-
prise.”  Professor Cassidy Brewer states that “[p]opularly defined, social enterprise
means using traditional business methods to accomplish charitable or socially ben-
eficial objectives.”  Cassady V. Brewer, A Novel Approach to Using LLCs for Quasi-
Charitable Endeavors (A/K/A “Social Enterprise”), 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 678, 679
(2011).  Social enterprises may be characterized as measuring success by a “double
bottom line” of “profitability and serving a public good” or a “triple bottom line” of
“people, profit, and the planet.” See Linda O. Smiddy, Corporate Creativity: The Ver-
mont L3C & Other Developments in Social Entrepreneurship, 35 VT. L. REV. 3, 4–5
(2010) (citing JOHN ELKINGTON, CANNIBALS WITH FORKS: THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE
OF 21ST CENTURY BUSINESS (1999)).  For a discussion of competing definitions of
the term, see Alicia E. Plerhoples, Representing Social Enterprise, 20 CLINICAL L. REV.
215, 223–25 (2013) and J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise,
Certifications, and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 4 n.4 (2012).
2. See CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 3 (1935).
3. See Smiddy, supra note 1, at 6.
4. See infra Section II.A.
5. See FAQ, BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp.net/faq [https://perma.cc/
WP9C-XM5H] (last visited Feb. 18, 2017).
(27)
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they do, difficult positive and normative questions will be raised as to how
the unique legal characteristics of a social enterprise affect creditors’
rights and interact with bankruptcy law.  Do directors’ duties to take into
account societal and stakeholder interests conflict with the recognized fi-
duciary duties owed by an insolvent firm’s directors to its creditors?
Should considerations about preservation of a firm’s social mission—con-
siderations that drive much of the appeal for social enterprise legisla-
tion—necessarily be thrown out the window in a time of financial distress,
or is there a path for preserving a social mission through a restructuring?
And, when a bankruptcy proceeding causes negative consequences for a
debtor’s customers, employees, or local community, should it matter that
the debtor was formed with a purpose of protecting the interests of those
same stakeholders?
This Article identifies the conflicts between social enterprise legisla-
tion and bankruptcy law and presents a normative argument for a legal
regime that would harmonize the two.  Focusing on benefit corporations,
the most widely adopted social enterprise form, this Article observes that
existing law leaves uncertainty as to the role of directors at a time of finan-
cial distress and will produce outcomes that are at odds with the core goals
of social enterprise legislation.  Then, drawing on academic proposals for
contract-based systems of bankruptcy, this Article argues that just as a firm
may opt out of a corporate governance norm of pure shareholder wealth
maximization through the selection of the benefit corporation form, a
firm should be permitted to opt out of a bankruptcy norm of pure credi-
tor wealth maximization through that same selection.  A firm and its credi-
tors could thus effectively contract into a unique bankruptcy regime for
benefit corporations.  Looking to the distinctive treatment of nonprofits
and railroads in bankruptcy as precedent, this Article proposes a regime in
which the same stakeholder interests that must be considered by the direc-
tors of a solvent benefit corporation would be required to be considered
by such directors, and by the court, in a bankruptcy proceeding.
Finally, this Article argues that the availability of such a regime as a
default rule for benefit corporations would on the whole produce more
efficient bankruptcy outcomes.  Investors in benefit corporations exhibit a
preference for trading off some degree of wealth maximization in ex-
change for the in-kind returns associated with reducing the negative exter-
nalities, and increasing the positive externalities, of corporate behavior.
By opting into a stakeholder-friendly bankruptcy system, investors could
similarly trade off some degree of wealth maximization, by virtue of a
higher cost of debt, in order to reduce the negative externalities and in-
crease the positive externalities of financial failure.  By better aligning
bankruptcy outcomes with such preferences, the proposed regime would
on the whole result in greater efficiency and societal wealth.
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part II assesses the origins of social
enterprise legislation, the key components of benefit corporations and re-
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lated social enterprise forms, and the academic debate as to the necessity
of such legislation.  Part III explores why bankruptcy law matters for bene-
fit corporations and argues that existing law and scholarship provide un-
satisfactory guidance as to both the application of existing law and the
normative question of what should happen to benefit corporations in
bankruptcy.  Part IV finds theoretical support for a unique set of bank-
ruptcy rules for benefit corporations in the rich academic literature re-
garding the theoretical underpinnings of bankruptcy law.  Part V draws
from the bankruptcy law of nonprofits and railroads to propose specific
amendments to both the Bankruptcy Code and benefit corporation stat-
utes so as to implement a unique bankruptcy regime for benefit corpora-
tions.6  Then, it analyzes the ex ante efficiency implications of such a
regime.
II. SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW AND THEORY
A. Social Enterprise Legislation
Starting with Vermont’s passage of the first “low-profit limited liability
company” statute in 2008, a majority of states have now passed legislation
recognizing one or more “social enterprise” legal forms.7  Twenty-seven
states and the District of Columbia have enacted benefit corporation stat-
utes, three states have enacted public benefit corporation statutes, three
states have enacted social purpose corporation statutes, eight states have
enacted “low profit liability company” statutes, and three states have en-
acted “benefit limited liability company” statutes.8  These legal forms are
designed to facilitate a business model in which directors need not priori-
tize profits at the expense of a firm’s other stakeholders, including em-
ployees, customers, local communities, and, on a larger scale, the
environment and society as a whole.  Social enterprise statutes generally
require that corporate decision-making take into account the interests of
such stakeholders, in addition to the interests of shareholders.9  Except
where noted otherwise, this Article focuses on the “model” benefit corpo-
6. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1174 (2012).  This portion of the Bankruptcy Code is
commonly referred to as “Chapter 11.”
7. See Robert Lang & Elizabeth Carrott Minnigh, The L3C, History, Basic Con-
struct, and Legal Framework, 35 VT. L. REV. 15, 19 (2010) (noting “Vermont became
the first state in the country to adopt the L3C” in 2008).
8. See Status Tool, SOC. ENTERPRISE L. TRACKER, http://socentlawtracker.org
[https://perma.cc/8YWS-RBZ9] (last visited Feb. 18, 2017).
9. See WILLIAM H. CLARK ET AL., THE NEED AND RATIONALE FOR THE BENEFIT
CORPORATION: WHY IT IS THE LEGAL FORM THAT BEST ADDRESSES THE NEEDS OF
SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS, INVESTORS, AND, ULTIMATELY, THE PUBLIC, BENEFIT CORP.
7–14 (2013), http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Benefit_Corpora-
tion_White_Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/8V3M-6PC5] [hereinafter BENEFIT COR-
PORATION WHITE PAPER] (discussing legal rationale for benefit corporation
legislation).  While all social enterprise statutes embody such a requirement, the
low-profit limited liability company form is unique in that it is specifically designed
to attract and facilitate “program related investments” from private foundations.
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ration statute promoted by B Lab, the most widely adopted and visible
social enterprise form.10  Generally, the same considerations discussed in
this Article apply to benefit corporation statutes that differ from B Lab’s
model approach and to other related social enterprise statutes.  There are
certain important distinctions that are addressed further in Sections II.D.
and V.B.3.
B. The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Debate
While benefit corporation statutes and their brethren are a relatively
new phenomenon, they are designed to address an unsettled question that
has been debated in legal academia for nearly a century: does, and should,
corporate law embody a “shareholder wealth maximization norm,” where
the sole objective of a corporation’s directors is maximizing shareholder
wealth?11  Professor Stephen Bainbridge has observed that the debate over
this question flares up roughly every twenty years, positing that it is a per-
ennial problem “on which each new academic generation . . . feels obliged
to puts its stamp.”12  In the 1930s, professors Adolf Berle and E. Merrick
Dodd debated the issue in a series of Harvard Law Review articles.13  Berle
argued that corporations function like trusts, with directors acting as trust-
ees of property on behalf of shareholders, while Dodd argued that a cor-
poration is “an economic institution” with “a social service as well as a
profit-making function.”14  In the 1950s, in large part in response to the
New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision to uphold a corporation’s large do-
nation to Princeton University in A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow,15
Berle and others “revisited the debate.”16  In the 1970s, when a debate
emerged regarding corporate social responsibility,17 economist Milton
Friedman famously stated, “[t]here is only one social responsibility of busi-
ness—to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its
10. See infra notes 45–48 and accompanying text for background on B Lab
and its model benefit corporation statute.
11. See Murray, supra note 1, at 5–9 (summarizing history of academic debate
regarding shareholder-wealth maximization norm).
12. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization
Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1435 n.40 (1993).
13. See Robert T. Esposito, The Social Enterprise Revolution in Corporate Law: A
Primer on Emerging Corporate Entities in Europe and the United States and the Case for the
Benefit Corporation, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 639, 650 (2013) (summarizing de-
bate between Berle and Dodd).
14. Compare Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L.
REV. 1049, 1073–74 (1931), with E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Man-
agers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1148 (1932).
15. 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953).
16. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corpo-
ratist Origins: Adolf Berle and the Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 133–34 (2008)
(describing Berle’s role as advocate in Barlow and his shifting view on debate in
following years); see also Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 1435 n.40.
17. See Bainbridge, supra note 12, 1435 n.40.
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profits.”18  In the early 1990s, Professor Ronald Green argued for a “multi-
fiduciary stakeholder perspective” that takes into account non-shareholder
constituents, with Bainbridge responding with a defense of the share-
holder wealth maximization norm.19  Further, in the late 1990s, professors
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout advanced a “team production theory,” con-
ceptualizing a corporation as a collaborative team with directors allocating
profits and losses among various shareholder and non-shareholder constit-
uents so as to reward their contributions to the team.20
Neither case law nor statutes provide a clear answer as to whether
traditional corporate law actually mandates a strict shareholder wealth
maximization norm.  Professor Ian Lee observes that both advocates and
critics of the norm “exaggerate its claim to describe accurately the state of
corporate law” and that “[t]he legal situation is, in fact, persistently ambig-
uous.”21  Many state statutes require directors to act in the best interests of
“the corporation” or of “the corporation and its shareholders,”22 but it is
by no means clear that such standards strictly conform to a shareholder
wealth maximization norm.23  In fact, certain of the same states have in
place “constituency statutes,” laws most commonly passed in the 1980s that
“permit the board of directors to consider the interests of non-shareholder
constituencies.”24  Constituency statutes appear to go a long way in qualify-
ing the primacy of the shareholder wealth maximization norm.  However,
they are missing in several states, including Delaware, and even where
adopted, they have been criticized by some social enterprise proponents as
18. See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Profits,
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32.
19. Compare Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 1446, with Ronald Green, Sharehold-
ers as Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors of Corporate Governance, 50 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1409, 1419 (1993).
20. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corpo-
rate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 250–51, 269–70, 276–81, 291–92 (1999).
21. See Ian B. Lee, Corporate Law, Profit Maximization, and the “Responsible” Share-
holder, 10 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 31, 33 (2005).  Lee observes that “[i]n the all-
important state of Delaware, there remains no statutory statement of the entity or
individuals to whom directors owe their duty of loyalty,” and that “the common law
duty is articulated as one of ‘undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation.’” Id.
at 34 n.118 (citing Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939)).
22. See, e.g, CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a) (West 2016) (requiring directors to act
“in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders”); 805 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/8.85 (LexisNexis 2016) (requiring directors to act in “best long term
and short term interests of the corporation”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78.138(1)
(LexisNexis 2016) (requiring directors to act in “the interests of the corporation”);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-1(2) (West 2016) (requiring directors to act in “best inter-
est of the corporation”); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (Consol. 2016) (requiring
directors to act in “the long-term and the short-term interests of the corporation
and its shareholders”).
23. See Lee, supra note 21, at 33–34.
24. See id. at 34 (emphasis added).
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providing inadequate guidance as to the extent to which constituents’ in-
terests can actually be taken into account.25
C. Dodge v. Ford, eBay v. Newmark, and Ben & Jerry’s
Advocates for social enterprise legislation have honed in on two high-
profile cases, Dodge v. Ford26 and eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark,27
as well as the takeover of Ben & Jerry’s by Unilever, as evidencing the
constraints of the shareholder wealth maximization norm and the neces-
sity of new corporate forms that reject it.28
Dodge v. Ford, a 1919 Michigan Supreme Court case, is often cited by
legal scholars as a seminal authority for the shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion norm.29  Henry Ford, president of Ford Motor Company, had
adopted a company policy not to pay any special dividends, declaring it his
ambition “to spread the benefits of this industrial system to the greatest
possible number” by “putting the greatest share of our profits back into
the business.”30  Minority shareholders John and Horace Dodge objected,
arguing that the shareholders were entitled to a share of the company’s
surplus that far exceeded the regular dividends they had been receiving
on its authorized capital stock.31  They ultimately brought a lawsuit de-
manding payment of a significant dividend.32
The Michigan Supreme Court found for the Dodges.33  As Lynn Stout
notes, the decision included a “remark that is regularly repeated in corpo-
rate law casebooks today”34:
There should be no confusion . . . .  A business corporation is
organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stock-
holders.  The powers of the directors are to be employed for that
end.  The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice
25. See, e.g., William H. Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit Corpora-
tions Are Redefining the Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 817,
831 (2012) (stating lack of case law and context “makes it difficult for directors to
know exactly how, when, and to what extent they can consider [constituent]
interests”).
26. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
27. 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010).
28. See, e.g., BENEFIT CORPORATION WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 6, 11–13;
Clark, Jr. & Babson, supra note 25, at 826–28, 837–38; MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS-
LATION § 301 cmt. (B LAB 2016) (“By requiring the consideration of interests of
constituencies other than the shareholders, the section rejects the holdings in
Dodge v. Ford . . . and eBay Domestic 584 Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark . . . that directors
must maximize the financial value of a corporation.” (citations omitted)).
29. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 1423; Clark, Jr. & Babson, supra note
25, at 825–26; but see Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3
VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163, 174–76 (2008).
30. See Dodge, 170 N.W. at 683.
31. See id. at 672.
32. See id. at 673.
33. See id. at 685.
34. See Stout, supra note 29, at 165.
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of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in
the end itself . . . .35
Despite the court’s clear language affirming the primacy of shareholder
wealth maximization, Dodge v. Ford has been dismissed by some commenta-
tors as irrelevant, an anomaly, and even a mistake, not to mention, nearly
100 years old and from a state court without a prominent role in corporate
law jurisprudence.36
Far more recently, in eBay, the directors of craigslist enacted “rights
plans” to prevent minority shareholder eBay from gaining control of the
company, arguing that “eBay’s acquisition of control . . . would fundamen-
tally alter craigslist’s values, culture and business model, including depart-
ing from [craigslist’s] public-service mission in favor of increased
monetization of craigslist.”37  The Delaware Chancery Court sided with
eBay, stating that “[p]romoting, protecting, or pursuing nonstockholder
considerations must lead at some point to value for stockholders,” and
that “[d]irectors of a for-profit Delaware corporation cannot deploy a
rights plan to defend a business strategy that openly eschews stockholder
wealth maximization—at least not consistently with the directors’ fiduciary
duties under Delaware law.”38  While eBay has been cited by both social
enterprise proponents and corporate traditionalists as supporting the
shareholder wealth maximization norm, others have observed that the
holding was limited to the heightened scrutiny context of takeover de-
fenses and would not control in the context of general day-to-day corpo-
rate decision making.39
Finally, although never litigated, the takeover of Ben & Jerry’s has
been touted as the iconic example of the need for benefit corporation
35. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684, as stated in Stout, supra note 29, at 165.
36. See generally Stout, supra note 29, at 166–72 (arguing shareholder wealth
maximization doctrine articulated in Dodge was “mistake” lacking sound founda-
tion in actual corporate law, as well as outdated dictum “from a state court that
plays only a marginal role in the corporate law arena”); see also Einer Elhauge,
Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 773 (2005)
(observing that Michigan Supreme Court stated that profit-seeking is “primary”
corporate objective, but not exclusive one); Nathan Oman, Corporations and Auton-
omy Theories of Contract: A Critique of the New Lex Mercatoria, 83 DENV. U. L. REV.
101, 135–36 (2005) (arguing Dodge decision was not based on “some generalized
duty to maximize share value, but rather, because of the right of dissenting minor-
ity shareholders to be free from unreasonable oppression” (citing Dodge, 170 N.W.
at 684)).
37. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 32 (Del. Ch. 2010)
(citing Defs.’ Post-Trial Answering Br. 54).
38. Id. at 33.
39. See, e.g., BENEFIT CORPORATION WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 11–13 (rely-
ing on eBay while advocating for benefit corporation legislation); Leo E. Strine, Jr.,
Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea That For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 135, 151 (2012) (arguing “consternation” about eBay holding re-
flects naivete´ about true nature of corporations); see also Murray, supra note 1, at
14–15.
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legislation.40  In 2000, Ben & Jerry’s was sold to Unilever instead of a com-
peting group of investors, which included co-founder Ben Cohen, that
had made a bid to take the company private.41  Specifically, “Cohen
thought that the company could better protect its social mission if it stayed
[private],” but he stated that the board believed it was legally required to
accept the higher offer.42  However, as noted by J. Haskell Murray, com-
mentators have expressed “serious doubt as to whether Ben & Jerry’s had
to sell to Unilever,” even under “the enhanced scrutiny applied in the
takeover context.”43  Significantly, Vermont already had a constituency
statute in place expressly permitting directors to consider the interests of
non-shareholder constituents.44
D. B Lab Certification, Benefit Corporations, and Related
Social Enterprise Forms
The nonprofit organization B Lab is largely responsible for the crea-
tion of the benefit corporation form.  In 2007, prior to the enactment of
any social enterprise legislation, B Lab began certifying businesses as “B
Corporations” (or “B Corps”),45 a designation based on an assessment of a
business’s social and environmental performance, accountability, and
transparency.46  B Corporation (B Corp) status is not a legal form; rather,
B Lab likens it to the certification of coffee as “Fair Trade.”47  Observing
that corporate law appeared to prohibit public companies from adopting
the kind of mission necessary for B Corp certification, B Lab soon began
advocating for a legal form that would be consistent with its certification
40. See, e.g., BENEFIT CORPORATION WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 6 (stating
fears of traditional corporate framework constraining ability to pursue social mis-
sion are “exacerbated by cautionary tales of investor-led board takeovers of private
companies and stories like the iconic forced sale of Ben & Jerry’s to Unilever”); see
also Kevin Ercoline, Note, Beyond Puffery: Providing Shareholder Assurance of Societal
Good Will in Crowdfunded Benefit Corporations, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 169, 174–77 (2014);
Clark & Babson, supra note 25, at 837–38.
41. See Constance L. Hays, Ben & Jerry’s Takeover Is Seen Close, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
12, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/04/12/business/ben-jerry-s-takeover-is-
seen-close.html [https://perma.cc/G8R3-Z8VM].
42. See April Dembosky, Protecting Companies That Mix Profitability, Values, NPR
(Mar. 9, 2010, 12:00 AM), www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=
124468487 [https://perma.cc/2UTY-U9EL]; Murray, supra note 1, at 36 (citing
Dembosky, supra).
43. See Murray, supra note 1, at 16 (citing Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Freez-
ing Out Ben & Jerry: Corporate Law and the Sale of a Social Enterprise Icon, 35 VT. L.
REV. 211, 233–42 (2010)).
44. See id.; Lang & Minnigh, supra note 7, at 19.
45. See About B Lab, Our History, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/what-
are-b-corps/the-non-profit-behind-b-corps/our-history [https://perma.cc/X7PP-
DNY9] (last visited Feb. 18, 2017).
46. See What are B Corps?, B LAB, https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-
corps [https://perma.cc/TZ5V-KL3S] (last visited Feb. 18, 2017).
47. See id. (“B Corp is to business what Fair Trade certification is to cof-
fee . . . .”); see also Murray, supra note 1, at 21.
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and promulgated the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation (MBCL),
drafted by William H. Clark, Jr.48  The commentary to the MBCL explicitly
states that its goal is to create a corporate form that rejects the shareholder
wealth maximization norm:
This chapter authorizes the organization of a form of business
corporation that offers entrepreneurs and investors the option to
build, and invest in, a business that operates with a corporate
purpose broader than maximizing shareholder value and that
consciously undertakes a responsibility to maximize the benefits
of its operations for all stakeholders, not just shareholders.49
The central “distinctive features of a benefit corporation” under the
MBCL, as compared to a traditional corporation, are that
(1) it has a corporate purpose to create a material, positive im-
pact on society and the environment; (2) the duties of its direc-
tors are expanded to require consideration of interests in
addition to the financial interest of its shareholders; and (3) it is
required to report each year on its overall social and environ-
mental performance using a . . . third-party standard.50
The second feature is accomplished by requiring directors to consider
the effects of any action or inaction upon “shareholders,” “employees,”
“customers,” “community and societal factors, including those of each
community in which offices or facilities of the benefit corporation, its sub-
sidiaries, or its suppliers are located,” “the local and global environment,”
“the short-term and long-term interests of the benefit corporation,” and
“the ability of the benefit corporation to accomplish its general public
benefit purpose and any specific public benefit purpose.”51  Additionally,
directors are permitted to consider any other interests that are cited in the
relevant state’s constituency statutes and any “other pertinent factors or
the interests of any other group that they deem appropriate.”52  However,
unless otherwise expressly provided in the corporation’s charter docu-
ments, the stakeholders embodying the nonfinancial interests listed above
do not have direct legal rights.  Claims or actions for violations of statutory
duties or standards, termed “benefit enforcement proceedings,” may be
brought only “directly by the benefit corporation” or “derivatively” by a
“director,” shareholders owning two percent or more of the corporation’s
48. See Susan Adams, Capitalist Monkey Wrench, FORBES (Mar. 25, 2010, 1:20
PM), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0412/rebuilding-b-lab-corporate-citi
zenship-green-incorporation-mixed-motives.html [https://perma.cc/TPQ9-ZFZK]
(reporting that B Lab found that in nineteen states company could not obtain B
Corp certification without running afoul of directors’ duty to put shareholders
first).  For the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, see supra note 28.
49. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 101 cmt. (B LAB 2016).
50. Clark & Babson, supra note 25, at 818–19.
51. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 301(a)(1).
52. See id. § 301(a)(2).
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equity or five percent or more of a parent corporation’s equity, or “other
persons” indicated in the charter documents.53
In 2010, Maryland became the first state to pass benefit corporation
legislation, and other states quickly followed.54  As of February 2017,
thirty-two states and the District of Columbia have enacted legislation for
either benefit corporations or the related forms public benefit corpora-
tions or social purpose corporations, and four more have introduced pro-
posed legislation that is under consideration.55  Most state statutes have
largely followed the approach of the MBCL with some modifications.  Del-
aware, in response to certain criticisms of the MBCL, instead created a
distinct form called a public benefit corporation, with Colorado and Min-
nesota later taking the same approach.56  Similarly, California adopted its
own unique statute creating a form originally called a “flexible purpose
corporation” and later renamed a social purpose corporation57 (in addi-
tion to adopting a benefit corporation statute based on the MBCL),58 and
Washington and Florida followed suit.59
The most notable distinction between these forms for purposes of this
Article is that benefit corporations, public benefit corporations, and social
purpose corporations take different approaches regarding the specificity
of a social enterprise’s public benefit.  A benefit corporation under the
MBCL must have the purpose of creating a general public benefit, which
is defined broadly and uniformly for all benefit corporations, and may ad-
ditionally elect to adopt one or more other specific public benefits in its
charter.60  The purpose of a public benefit corporation, on the other
53. See id. §§ 102, 305.
54. See Murray, supra note 1, at 22 (citing MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS
§§ 5-6C-01-5-6c-08 (West 2016)).
55. See Status Tool, supra note 8.
56. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362 (West 2016); see also COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 7-101-503 (West 2016); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 304A.102 (West 2016).
57. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2500–3503 (West 2016).  The flexible purpose
corporation statute in California gave directors the flexibility to consider the inter-
ests of various stakeholders without requiring them to do so (hence the word “flex-
ible”), but as of January 1, 2015 was amended and retitled the “social purpose
corporation” statute to require directors to take into account the specific social
purposes set forth in the corporation’s charter. See S.B. 1301, 2014 Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013–2014).
58. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 14600–14631 (West 2016).
59. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 23b.25.005–23b.25.150 (West 2016); see also
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 607.504–607.513 (West 2016).  In addition, Texas enacted a
statute permitting for-profit corporations to adopt a “social purpose,” but unlike
social purpose corporation statutes, it does not authorize the creation of a new
corporate form. See TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. §§ 1.002(82-a), 3.007, 21.101,
21.401 (West 2016).
60. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. Legislation § 201.  “General Public Benefit” is
defined as “[a] material positive impact on society and the environment, taken as a
whole, assessed against a third-party standard, from the business and operations of
a benefit corporation.” Id. § 102.  A “Specific Public Benefit” is defined as includ-
ing both a menu of six potential benefits that are expressly listed, as well as any
10
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hand, includes only whatever specific public benefit is elected in its char-
ter.61  Falling somewhere in between those two standards, a social purpose
corporation must have a general public benefit that is chosen from a set
menu of broadly defined purposes listed in the statute,62 and may addi-
tionally elect to adopt one or more other specific public benefits.63
E. Benefit Corporation Debate
While proponents of benefit corporations have been quite successful
in enacting legislation, the necessity and wisdom of the benefit corpora-
tion as a legal form remains the subject of academic debate.  As noted
above, proponents have argued that benefit corporation legislation is nec-
essary to free businesses from the shackles of the shareholder wealth max-
imization norm and avoid the outcomes of Dodge v. Ford, eBay, and the Ben
& Jerry’s takeover.64  Critics, on the other hand, have argued that existing
legal forms provide sufficient flexibility for directors to pursue goals other
than increasing shareholder value.  In some cases, critics have argued that
the existence of the benefit corporation form is both unnecessary and
harmful, with one going so far as to deem social enterprise legislation a
“con” designed to “enable purportedly social and stakeholder-focused en-
terprises to tug on unwitting equity investors’ heartstrings in order to
loosen their purse strings.”65  A number of other commentators have ar-
other “particular benefit on society or the environment” a benefit corporation may
choose that is not expressly listed. See id.
61. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362.  Some criticize the “general public bene-
fit” approach of the MBCL and argue that the Delaware approach is “superior,”
although not as effective as an even more flexible approach. See J. William Calli-
son, Benefit Corporations, Innovation, and Statutory Design, 26 REGENT U. L. REV. 143,
157–58 (2013); see also Murray, supra note 1, at 32–33.
62. A Washington social purpose corporation must “promote positive short-
term or long-term effects of, or minimize adverse short-term or long-term effects
of, the corporation’s activities upon any or all of (1) the corporation’s employees,
suppliers, or customers; (2) the local, state, national, or world community; or
(3) the environment.” See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23b.25.020.  A California social
purpose corporation may choose from a similar set of general public benefits or
alternatively may be organized for “[o]ne or more charitable or public purpose
activities that a nonprofit public benefit corporation is authorized to carry out.”
See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2602(b)(2)(A) (West 2016).  A Florida social purpose cor-
poration must have a purpose of creating
a positive effect, or the minimization of negative effects, taken as a whole,
on the environment or on one or more categories of persons or entities,
other than shareholders in their capacity as shareholders, of an artistic,
charitable, economic, educational, cultural, literary, religious, social, eco-
logical, or scientific nature, from the business and operations of a social
purpose corporation.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.502(6) (West 2016).
63. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2602(b)(1)(A)–(B); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.502;
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §23b.25.030.
64. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
65. See David Groshoff, Contrepreneurship? Examining Social Enterprise Legisla-
tion’s Feel-Good Governance Giveaways, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 233, 234, 240 (2013) (argu-
ing social enterprise advocates have advanced “deceptive maze of needless [social
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gued that traditional corporate law already provides most of the flexibility
social enterprise proponents seek, but that benefit corporation legislation
is nonetheless advisable due to the pervasive perception, accurate or not,
that the shareholder wealth maximization norm ties directors’ hands,66 or
due to the practical benefits of creating a focal point and institutional
structure “around which socially minded players can align their
interests.”67
Moving beyond the question of the necessity of benefit corporation
legislation, commentators have also ventured into assigning a deeper theo-
retical framework to the benefit corporation form.  The American Bar As-
sociation’s (ABA) Corporate Laws Committee describes benefit
corporation legislation as a shift away from a “property model” of corpo-
rate law to an “‘entity model’” because it provides for a corporation that
does not solely “serve the interests” of its owners.68  This theory is consis-
tent with popular descriptions of benefit corporations and their directors
serving “three masters instead of one.”69  A competing view is that benefit
corporations actually embrace a property model and, in fact, serve only
their shareholders, with the unique legal form serving as a contract be-
tween directors and shareholders who wish to receive both a “monetary
return” and an “in-kind” return in the form of the satisfaction resulting
from “investing in socially responsible companies.”70  This view draws on a
theoretical model developed to explain why public companies often sacri-
fice shareholder value by making charitable contributions, which proposes
that such investors are being offered a composite financial product con-
enterprise legislation] using ethically-questionable marketing” in order to allow
managers to engage in value-destructive behavior that would expose them to liabil-
ity under traditional corporate law); see also Justin Blount & Kwabena Offei-Danso,
The Benefit Corporation: A Questionable Solution to a Non-Existent Problem, 44 ST. MARY’S
L.J. 617, 663, 669–70 (2013) (arguing benefit corporation legislation is unneces-
sary and that, “[b]y requiring managers to pursue multiple objectives and consider
all stakeholders’ interests equally, the benefit corporation makes it more likely that
none of these objectives will be fulfilled”); Kennan El Khatib, Comment, The Harms
of the Benefit Corporation, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 151, 152, 181–86 (2015) (arguing bene-
fit corporation form is primed for abuse and “green-washing” and creates “harmful
dichotomy with traditional for-profit companies” by which companies will be “eval-
uate[d] [ ] based on legal status instead of business practices”).
66. See Murray, supra note 1, at 52.
67. See Regina Robson, A New Look at Benefit Corporations: Game Theory and
Game Changer, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 501, 504, 533–41 (2015); see also Joseph W. Yockey,
Does Social Enterprise Law Matter?, 66 ALA. L. REV. 767, 769 (2015).
68. See Corp. Laws Comm., ABA Bus. Law Section, Benefit Corporation White
Paper, 68 BUS. LAW. 1083, 1083–84 (2013).
69. See, e.g., Daniel Fisher, Delaware ‘Public Benefit Corporation’ Lets Directors Serve
Three Masters Instead of One, FORBES (July 16, 2013, 2:06 PM), http://www.
forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2013/07/16/delaware-public-benefit-corporation-
lets-directors-serve-three-masters-instead-of-one/#7ab6788c215a [https://perma.cc
/2566-GFB8].
70. See Jacob E. Hasler, Note, Contracting for Good: How Benefit Corporations Em-
power Investors and Redefine Shareholder Value, 100 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1304–05, 1311
(2014).
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sisting of “both the economic return and . . . the warm glow” derived from
contributing to charity.71
III. WHY BANKRUPTCY LAW MATTERS
As outlined above in Part II, benefit corporation statutes aim to de-
part from the perceived shareholder profit maximization norm.  They do
so primarily by regulating the respective rights and obligations of a corpo-
ration and its directors, on the one hand, and its shareholders, on the
other hand, through provisions requiring directors to consider the impact
of decisions on non-shareholder stakeholders.  However, benefit corpora-
tion statutes are silent on how the rights of creditors are implicated by
such stakeholder provisions, leaving unanswered questions as to how bene-
fit corporation statutes would affect bankruptcy proceedings under ex-
isting law.72  Similarly, the increasingly vast amount of scholarship on
social enterprises has paid little attention to issues of financial failure, leav-
71. See id. at 1282, 1306 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Joshua
Graff Zivin & Arthur Small, A Modigliani-Miller Theory of Altruistic Corporate Social
Responsibility, 5 J. ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1 (2005)).
72. The Connecticut benefit corporation statute arguably provides a limited
exception in that it speaks to the consequences of a benefit corporation’s dissolu-
tion under certain circumstances. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-1355(b) (West
2016).  The Connecticut statute largely follows the MBCL, but it is unique in that it
permits benefit corporations to adopt, via a unanimous shareholder vote, a “legacy
preservation provision” intended to preserve the entity as a benefit corporation in
perpetuity. See id. § 33-1355(a).  In addition to prohibiting an acquisition by or
merger into any entity other than a benefit corporation that itself has adopted a
legacy preservation provision, it requires that a “dissolved benefit corporation”
must distribute its “remaining property” only to charitable organizations or other
benefit corporations that have adopted legacy preservation provisions. See id. § 33-
1355(b).  While at first blush this may appear to have implications for bankruptcy,
a “dissolution” is a corporate event that is distinct from and may be, but need not
be, accompanied by a bankruptcy proceeding.  A dissolved corporation continues
its corporate existence with limited capacity to carry on any business except that
business appropriate to winding up and liquidating its business and affairs. See
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 33-884 (West 2016).  Further, the statute speaks solely to
how “remaining” property is distributed, without any further definition. See id.
§ 33-884(a).  This could be interpreted as referring to all property of the corpora-
tion that remains immediately prior to dissolution or to all property of the corpo-
ration that remains after assets have been applied to pay all claims of creditors in
full.  The nonprofit organization that promoted and helped draft the legacy pres-
ervation provision in the Connecticut benefit corporation statute, reSET—Social
Enterprise Trust—has stated that “[t]he provision . . . requires the company, if
liquidated, to distribute all assets after the settling of debts to one or more benefit
corporations or 501(c)(3) organizations with similar social missions.” See James
Woulfe, H.B. 6356 and Legacy Preservation, RESET (Feb. 20, 2013), http://
www.socialenterprisetrust.org/blog/2013/02/20/h-b-6356s-legacy-preservation-
provision [https://perma.cc/A5RN-LXVE] (emphasis added).  While not disposi-
tive as to statutory interpretation, this commentary indicates that the provision was
intended only to govern the disposition of assets remaining after creditors are paid
in full, in which case the statute would not speak to the critical issues pertaining to
benefit corporation bankruptcies discussed in Part III.
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ing normative questions about the implications of financial distress for the
goals of social enterprise legislation unanswered.73
This Part argues that the treatment of benefit corporations in bank-
ruptcy is a critical issue for their constituents.  First, the obligations of di-
rectors mandated by benefit corporation statutes conflict with the well-
established principle that directors of an insolvent corporation have fidu-
ciary duties to the corporation’s creditors.  Left unresolved, this conflict
creates uncertainty that is problematic for both directors and creditors of
benefit corporations.  Second, as a normative matter, a bankruptcy regime
that ignores stakeholder interests would be inconsistent with the rationale
for investment in benefit corporations.
A. Benefit Corporation Statutes Conflict with Duties to Creditors in Insolvency
The fiduciary duties of a firm’s directors in bankruptcy support a
norm of creditor wealth maximization that closely resembles the share-
holder wealth maximization norm outside of bankruptcy.  Although not
expressly provided in the Bankruptcy Code, case law has established that a
bankruptcy trustee has a duty to maximize the value of the bankrupt es-
tate.74  As a debtor-in-possession enjoys the rights of a trustee and must
fulfill the duties of a trustee, it too is obligated to maximize estate value.75
Further, a debtor-in-possession’s directors continue to owe fiduciary duties
to the firm, but its creditors effectively become the principal beneficiaries
of such duties and may enforce them by derivative actions.76  The Dela-
ware Supreme Court recently articulated the principle as follows:
It is well settled that directors owe fiduciary duties to the corpora-
tion.  When a corporation is solvent, those duties may be enforced
by its shareholders, who have standing to bring derivative actions
on behalf of the corporation because they are the ultimate bene-
ficiaries of the corporation’s growth and increased value.  When
a corporation is insolvent, however, its creditors take the place of
the shareholders as the residual beneficiaries of any increase in
value . . . .  The corporation’s insolvency “makes the creditors the
73. As discussed further infra notes 78–79 and accompanying text, practition-
ers have written about the question of whether social enterprise statutes and bank-
ruptcy law principles create conflicting fiduciary duties for directors. See Alec P.
Ostrow, Inversion of Supremacy? LC3s and Benefit Corporations: Can Changes to State
Law Control Conduct of Bankruptcy Cases?, 34 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 36 (2015); Gary M.
Schildhorn & Brya M. Keilson, The Unresolved Dilemma of Creditors’ Vs. Stakeholders’
Rights, 32 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 58 (2013).
74. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343,
352 (1985); Myers v. Martin (In re Martin), 91 F.3d 389, 394 (3d Cir. 1996).
75. See, e.g., La. World Exposition v. Fed. Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 233, 246 (5th Cir.
1988).
76. See, e.g., Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C. v. NCT Grp., Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 792 (Del.
Ch. 2004).
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principal constituency injured by any fiduciary breaches that di-
minish the firm’s value.”77
Benefit corporation statutes add an obvious wrinkle to this frame-
work: directors of a benefit corporation are required by statute to consider
the effects of any action or inaction upon the interests of other stakehold-
ers, not just the corporation’s shareholders.  Two articles penned by bank-
ruptcy law practitioners in the American Bankruptcy Law Institute Journal
have identified this as presenting directors of insolvent benefit corpora-
tions with conflicting legal mandates.  Gary Schildhorn and Brya Keilson
observe that benefit corporation statutes conflict with the fiduciary duties
of the directors of an insolvent company in the context of a sale of a
debtor’s assets under § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.78  Alec Ostrow ob-
serves that benefit corporation and other social enterprise statutes conflict
with such fiduciary duties generally, citing asset sales as an example.79  In a
bidding process for an asset sale under § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code,
courts generally hold that the best bid is the one that yields the greatest
return to creditors.80  However, if a debtor is faced with two bids, one that
is higher in dollar amount but another that is more favorable in its treat-
ment of stakeholders, its directors’ legal obligation “to consider the inter-
ests of stakeholders” conflicts with the principle that they are obligated to
maximize the estate value for the benefit of their creditors.81
The interaction of these two conflicting legal mandates could be in-
terpreted in very different ways.  One interpretation is that when a corpo-
ration becomes insolvent, its duty to maximize the estate value for the
benefit of its creditors supersedes all of its pre-insolvency fiduciary duties,
including its duties to consider the interests of other stakeholders.  Alter-
natively, creditors could be viewed as merely stepping into the shoes of
shareholders, and directors would therefore be required to balance the
interests of creditors and other stakeholders just as they would be re-
quired, pre-insolvency, to balance the interests of shareholders and other
77. N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d
92, 101–02 (Del. 2007) (quoting Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C., 863 A.2d at 794 n.67).
78. See Schildhorn & Keilson, supra note 73, at 59, 86 (arguing that to resolve
such conflict, § 363 “bidding procedures” should be “carefully considered” and
benefit corporations should “permit[ ] directors of insolvent benefit corporations
to give considerable weight to the interests of creditors”).
79. See Ostrow, supra note 73, 89–90 (concluding that “[w]ithout a clear direc-
tion from Congress . . .  [resolution] of this conflict may vary along with the facts of
each case”).
80. See, e.g., In re Integrated Res., Inc., 135 B.R. 746, 750 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.)
(“When a debtor desires to sell an asset, its main responsibility, and the primary
concern of the bankruptcy court, is the maximization of the value of the asset
sold.” (citing Bankruptcy Court Is Newest Arena for M & A Action, N.Y.L.J., June 3,
1991, at 8)).
81. See Schildhorn & Keilson, supra note 73, at 58.
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stakeholders.82  The argument could even be made that directors must
disregard the interests of creditors altogether, as in almost all cases benefit
corporation statutes “exclude[ ] creditors from the list of stakeholders”
whose interests must be considered.83
The uncertainty posed by this dilemma presents directors of an insol-
vent benefit corporation with a quandary.  If they make decisions serving
the interests of non-creditor stakeholders to the detriment of their credi-
tors, they risk the prospect of creditors asserting a breach of fiduciary du-
ties.  On the other hand, if they make decisions solely serving creditors at
the expense of other stakeholders, they risk the prospect of shareholders
or other qualified constituents bringing a benefit enforcement proceed-
ing.84  The uncertainty is problematic for creditors, as well.  A lender’s
financing decisions are informed, in part, by its expectations of return in a
downside scenario.85  Uncertainty as to the primacy of creditor-return
maximization in bankruptcy makes lending to a benefit corporation less
attractive, which should be expected to result in a higher cost of financing
for benefit corporations.86  Of course, if the legal standard were clarified
in a manner unambiguously adverse to creditors, that would also be unat-
tractive to lenders.  However, certainty would at least illuminate the trade-
offs associated with the benefit corporation form and help inform deci-
sions as to the desirability of its use.  Uncertainty, on the other hand, in-
creases the overall transaction costs associated with a benefit corporation
incurring debt.87
B. Bankruptcy Outcomes Matter for Socially-Conscious Benefit
Corporation Investors
This Section argues that at no time do the concerns that motivate
investment in a benefit corporation matter more than during financial dis-
tress.  In most bankruptcies, the assets of the bankrupt estate will be insuf-
ficient to pay all creditors in full, and therefore, the interests of the equity
holders, which rank behind creditors’ claims, will likely be wiped out en-
82. Significantly, the MBCL “excludes creditors from the list of stakeholders”
that must be considered by a benefit corporation’s directors in making decisions.
See id. at 59.
83. See id. at 58–59 (observing drafters of MBCL intentionally excluded credi-
tors “because existing state law is already available to creditors to protect their
interests” and arguing that “unintended consequence” may include § 363 sales
that “disregard[ ] the rights of creditors” altogether).
84. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 305 (B LAB 2016).
85. See Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107
YALE L.J. 1807, 1813 (1998).
86. See Schildhorn & Keilson, supra note 73, at 59.
87. See, e.g., Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents,
89 TEX. L. REV. 499, 574 (2011) (“For private parties, legal uncertainty increases
information costs, requires additional planning, and creates risk.”).
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tirely.88  One could argue, then, that an equity investor in a benefit corpo-
ration with a low prospect of recovery on its investment has little at stake in
the outcome of a bankruptcy.  However, a key rationale for the benefit
corporation form is to assure investors that a company is committed to
being, and will in fact continue to be, socially responsible.  There is per-
haps no more critical time for testing this than in a time of financial dis-
tress.  Further, a bankruptcy proceeding itself can cause massive
disruption to a company’s employees, customers, and community.  Pre-
sumably an investor who sought a corporate form specifically designed to
consider the needs of such stakeholders would want them taken into ac-
count not only when the company is financially viable, but also in a time of
financial distress when the fate of such stakeholders may depend on how
such distress is resolved.
C. Financial Distress Is a Key Moment for the Preservation of a Benefit
Corporation’s Commitment to Social Responsibility
It is possible for traditional corporations to act in a socially responsi-
ble manner, but the traditional corporate form does not assure investors
that a corporation will in fact do so.  A central rationale for the existence
of benefit corporation legislation, if not the central rationale, is the notion
that such assurance is valuable to a significant number of investors.  Bene-
fit corporation supporters argue that the statutes’ legal mandates prevent
“green-washing,” such as when a firm insincerely and misleadingly touts an
environmentally or socially-beneficial mission.89  As noted in Part II, prior
to the enactment of benefit corporation legislation, the majority of states
already had constituency statutes that permit directors to consider certain
non-shareholder constituents when fulfilling their fiduciary duties.90
What sets benefit corporation statutes apart is the requirement that they do
so.91  The notion of locking in a company’s social mission is thus integral
to the benefit corporation paradigm.
Investors motivated by a benefit corporation’s social mission should
be concerned about potential outcomes of financial distress, above and
beyond the obvious concern of potentially losing the financial value of
88. Pursuant to the absolute priority rule in § 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code, a
junior class of claimants may not receive any payment under a Chapter 11 plan of
reorganization until all higher-ranking classes are repaid in full, unless the higher-
ranking classes agree to be paid less. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (2012) (stating
that “the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of [the im-
paired] class [must] not receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior
claim or interest any property” in order for plan of reorganization to be confirmed
over dissent of impaired class).
89. See FAQ, supra note 5 (“The ‘general public benefit’ purpose helps pre-
vent abuse of this legislation by corporations interested in green-washing.”).
90. See Michal Barzuza, The State of State Antitakeover Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 1973,
1989, 2040 tb1.6 (2009); William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of
Delaware Law’s Continuing Success, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 35–36.
91. See BENEFIT CORPORATION WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 10–11.
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their investments.  Just as the prospect of acquisition threatens the contin-
uation of a firm’s mission, so does the prospect of financial failure.92  A
bankruptcy filing means that in all likelihood a business or its components
will be owned by different parties coming out of the proceeding than go-
ing in.  In a Chapter 7 proceeding, the company’s assets will be liquidated
to pay off creditors.  In a Chapter 11 proceeding, the company will be
restructured through a plan of reorganization or a sale of substantially all
of its assets, in either case typically resulting in wiping out all of the com-
pany’s equity.93  Thus, any bankruptcy of a benefit corporation is likely to
result in a change in ownership with no guarantee that the new owners
will have any commitment to the social mission that led investors to put
their money in the business in the first place.
D. Financial Distress Itself Impacts the Stakeholders That Benefit Corporation
Statutes Seek to Protect
Bankruptcy is often a devastating event for many constituencies in-
volved, not just a company’s shareholders and creditors.  As summarized
in Part IV below, bankruptcy scholars have long debated whether the
bankruptcy process should protect the interests of non-investor stakehold-
ers affected by financial distress, such as employees, customers, and the
community at large, or instead serve the single purpose of enhancing re-
turns to creditors.  Even those scholars taking the latter position recognize
that bankruptcies often do, in fact, have a huge impact on other stake-
holders.  Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson, leading proponents of a law-
and-economics conceptualization of bankruptcy that rejects non-creditor
stakeholder considerations, acknowledge that “[t]he economy of an entire
town can be disrupted when a large factory closes.  Many employees may
be put out of work.  The failure of one firm may lead to the failure of
those who supplied it with raw materials and those who acquired its fin-
ished products.”94
A benefit corporation investor should therefore care about bank-
ruptcy outcomes not only as they relate to the survival of the company’s
social mission, but also as they relate to the impact that a bankruptcy itself
92. As discussed supra note 28 and accompanying text, the prospect of an
acquisition scenario similar to the sale of Ben & Jerry’s is frequently cited by bene-
fit corporation proponents as evidence of the necessity of benefit corporation
statutes.
93. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
94. Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the
Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured
Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 101 (1984) (citing PETER J. COLEMAN,
DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA: INSOLVENCY, IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND
BANKRUPTCY, 1607–900 13 (1974)); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an
Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV. 336, 355 (1993) (“Business closings affect employ-
ees who will lose jobs, taxing authorities that will lose ratable property, suppliers
that will lose customers, nearby property owners who will lose beneficial neighbors,
and current customers who must go elsewhere.”).
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could have on the stakeholders who were intended to be protected by vir-
tue of the election of the benefit corporation form.  The application of
bankruptcy law will determine whether the business will remain as a going
concern or be liquidated, which parties will end up owning the restruc-
tured business or liquidated assets, and a host of other critical conse-
quences.  Benefit corporation statutes require that directors consider the
effects of any action or inaction on interests including “employees,” “cus-
tomers,” and the “community” in which the corporation is located.95  In-
vestors who choose to invest in a benefit corporation presumably have
some degree of interest in what happens to these stakeholders—otherwise
they would have not accepted the tradeoffs associated with departing from
the shareholder wealth maximization norm.  When a company is success-
ful, it is likely to be easier to serve all these varying interests while also
serving the pecuniary interests of shareholders.  It is precisely when a com-
pany is in financial distress that there are hard choices to be made and
there is most likely to be significant negative impact on these stakeholders,
depending in large part on the outcome of the bankruptcy proceeding.
IV. BANKRUPTCY THEORY AND BENEFIT CORPORATIONS
Part III showed why bankruptcy matters to the benefit corporation
investor and why the treatment of benefit corporations in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings should be resolved.  This Part explores the theoretical underpin-
nings of a bankruptcy regime that would recognize the stakeholder
interests identified in benefit corporation statutes.  First, it summarizes the
academic debate over the role of societal interests in bankruptcy proceed-
ings, which mirrors the shareholder wealth maximization debate summa-
rized in Section II.B.  Then, it argues that contractual models of
bankruptcy offered by law and economics scholars offer a theoretical
framework for a bankruptcy regime that recognizes the unique character-
istics of benefit corporations.
A. Bankruptcy Theory of Creditor Wealth Maximization Versus Stakeholder
Interests
Just as corporate governance scholars have long debated the share-
holder wealth maximization norm, bankruptcy scholars have long debated
whether the sole purpose of bankruptcy is to maximize value for creditors,
to which the Article will refer as the “creditor wealth maximi[z]ation”
norm.96  The two norms and the corresponding debates closely mirror
each other.  In a typical law and economics view of corporate governance,
shareholders are the residual claimants to the corporation’s assets, direc-
95. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. Legislation § 301(a) (B LAB 2016).
96. See Ann Wardrop, Theorising About Insolvency Law and the Public Interest in
the Context of Insolvent Utilities: An Australian Perspective, 29 BANKING & FIN. L. REV.
435, 459 (2014) (collecting sources and summarizing theoretical debate over pur-
poses of bankruptcy and whose interests it should serve).
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tors are agents of the shareholders, and therefore maximization of share-
holder value is the singular goal of corporate decision-making.97
Similarly, in a typical law and economics view of bankruptcy, residual
claims to the corporation’s assets shift primarily or exclusively to creditors
upon insolvency as a consequence of there being little or no equity.
Therefore, maximization of creditor wealth becomes the primary, if not
singular, fiduciary duty of the directors and goal of the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding.98  Further, just as an opposing camp of corporate governance
scholars argues that corporate decision making in fact can, and should,
take into account the interests of other stakeholders, an opposing camp of
bankruptcy scholars argues that bankruptcy law in fact does, and should,
take into account the interests of employees, customers, communities
where firms operate, and other constituencies.99
1. Law and Economics Theories of Bankruptcy
Since the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, law and economics schol-
ars have been at the forefront of attempts to create a theoretical account
of bankruptcy.100  The central normative claim of law and economics the-
ories is that the sole policy objective of bankruptcy law should be the en-
hancement of creditors’ collection efforts with a view to maximizing
creditors’ wealth, which in turn contributes to overall economic
efficiency.101
Within the overall rubric of creditor wealth maximization lie different
law and economics-oriented theories of bankruptcy.  The most influential
of these is Thomas Jackson’s “creditors’ bargain model,” which imagines
“bankruptcy as a system designed to mirror the agreement one would ex-
pect the creditors to form among themselves were they to negotiate such
an agreement from an ex ante position.”102  Jackson posits that such credi-
tors would agree to a collective proceeding resembling the existing bank-
ruptcy system on the basis that it better minimizes debt collection costs as
compared to a non-collective system in which creditors are left to avail
97. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Man-
agerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 305–16
(1976).
98. See JANIS SARRA, CREDITOR RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: RESTRUCTUR-
ING INSOLVENT CORPORATIONS 40–41 (2003) (analogizing dominant law and eco-
nomics models of corporate governance for solvent and insolvent firms).
99. See infra Section IV.A.3.
100. See Wardrop, supra note 96, at 446 (collecting sources and summarizing
history of such theoretical accounts).
101. See, e.g., THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
1–6 (1986); Barry E. Adler, Finance’s Theoretical Divide and the Proper Role of Insolvency
Rules, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1107, 1107–11 (1994); Frank H. Easterbrook, Is Corporate
Bankruptcy Efficient?, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 411 (1990); Robert K. Rasmussen, The Ex Ante
Effects of Bankruptcy Reform on Investment Incentives, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1159, 1159–65
(1994).
102. Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Credi-
tors’ Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 860 (1982).
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themselves of state law remedies.103  By implication the model accounts
only for consensual creditors, leaving out “nonconsensual creditors, in-
cluding tort claimants.”104  Further, it leaves out non-creditor parties who
may be impacted by the outcome of a bankruptcy proceeding, including
employees, customers, and suppliers.  It follows from such a model that
the purpose of bankruptcy is to serve the interests of creditors only.105
While accepting the general maxim of creditor wealth maximization,
other law and economics theorists have argued for the replacement of the
existing bankruptcy system with more market-based approaches.106
Among these are proposals to permit parties to contract for their own in-
solvency system, which will be addressed in more detail in Section IV.B.107
A common thread through the creditors’ bargain model and subsequent
law and economics theories is an emphasis on overall efficiency through
maximization of creditor returns as the goal of bankruptcy law,108 and
often a criticism of Chapter 11 as inefficient.109
2. Criticism of Law and Economics Theories of Bankruptcy
A varied group of academics and practitioners, sometimes referred to
as “traditionalists,” has criticized the primacy of the creditor wealth max-
imization norm as articulated by law and economics scholars.110  They ar-
gue that theories like the creditors’ bargain model, although coherent and
easily quantifiable, rest on “untested assumptions” and, while “pur-
port[ing] to avoid . . . normative and empirical issues,” are in fact “driven
103. See id. at 869.
104. See Donald R. Korobkin, Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of
Bankruptcy Law, 71 TEX. L. REV. 541, 555, 580 n.172 (1993).
105. See id. at 555 (“The outcome of the creditors’ bargain model, like any
other outcome emerging from a hypothetical choice situation, effectively mirrors
the interests and concerns of those persons who have chosen it.”).
106. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, A Theory of Corporate Insolvency, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV.
343 (1997); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101
HARV. L. REV. 775 (1988); Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice: A Menu Approach to
Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REV. 51, 53–54 (1992); Alan Schwartz, A Contract
Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 1807, 1808–09 (1998).
107. See, e.g., Rasmussen, supra note 106, at 53–54; Schwartz, supra note 106, at
1808–09.
108. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 106, at 343–44 (critiquing efficiency of bank-
ruptcy law’s ex post approach of preserving economically viable firms); Douglas G.
Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127, 128
(1986) (arguing there is little justification for availability of corporate reorganiza-
tions, as opposed to liquidations); Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Un-
tenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1048 (1992) (arguing “Chapter 11
almost certainly reduces social welfare” by “permit[ting] managers to make subop-
timal managerial decisions”).
110. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J.
573, 577 (1998).
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by normative values and empirical assumptions.”111  They observe that the
creditors’ bargain is essentially a circular model devised to produce eco-
nomic outcomes that suit those who are chosen to sit at the hypothetical
bargaining table—solely rational, wealth-maximizing contract creditors.112
Finally, they observe that a simplified model that boils bankruptcy down to
a maximization of creditor returns does not comport with the nuanced
system of bankruptcy law that exists in the real world.113
3. Traditionalist Theories of Bankruptcy
Under a traditionalist view, “bankruptcy law plays a special role in our
legal system and advances substantive goals” aside from efficient debt col-
lection.114  An example of this view is the “belie[f] that bankruptcy law
serves an important purpose in rehabilitating firms that, but for bank-
ruptcy protection, would fail,” taking into account the effect that firm fail-
ure can have on jobs, communities, and other societal interests.115
Douglas Baird, a self-described “proceduralist,” a term that in Baird’s de-
lineation of the two schools of bankruptcy theory roughly corresponds
with the law and economics school, contrasts the fundamental axioms of
traditionalists and proceduralists as follows:
In short, the traditional bankruptcy experts believe that: (1) the
preservation of firms (and therefore jobs) is an important and
independent goal of bankruptcy; (2) contemplation of the rights
and needs of the parties before the court matters more than the
effects on incentives before the fact; and (3) bankruptcy judges
should enjoy broad discretion to implement bankruptcy’s sub-
stantive policies.  The proceduralists, on the other hand, believe
that: (1) the preservation of firms is not an independent good in
itself; (2) ex ante effects are important; and (3) the judge, after
controlling for the biases and weaknesses of the parties and
resolving the legal disputes, must allow the parties to make their
own decisions and thereby choose their own destinies.116
A key aspect of traditionalist theories of bankruptcy is the notion that
the interests of non-creditor stakeholders should, to some degree, be con-
sidered in a proceeding.117  As a result, traditionalists emphasize “the
value of preserving firms.”118  In the 1980s, Elizabeth Warren posited that
111. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 800,
812 (1987).
112. See supra note 105.
113. See Warren, supra note 111, at 812–13.
114. See Baird, supra note 110, at 576 (collecting sources and describing “tra-
ditionalist” camp).
115. See id. at 577.
116. Id. at 579–80.
117. See id. at 578.
118. See id. at 579.
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stakeholders such as employees, customers, and suppliers are valid sub-
jects of bankruptcy law because they are already recognized by the Bank-
ruptcy Code to a limited degree.119  Warren points to legislative history to
argue that the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, which gives a failing firm the oppor-
tunity to reorganize under Chapter 11, was adopted “specifically to amelio-
rate [some of the] harmful effects” of business closings, thereby
“redistribut[ing] the benefits that would stem from creditors’ collection
rights to other parties.”120  Warren argues that bankruptcy law should, and
does, protect the interests of constituencies including “[t]he older em-
ployee, the regular customer, the dependent supplier, and the local com-
munity” of the debtor because of the “deeper social implications of
business failure in a highly integrated society.”121
Warren’s analysis rejects what has been dubbed the search for a “deep
structure” of bankruptcy, instead offering a “dirty, complex, elastic, inter-
connected view of bankruptcy.”122  Other traditionalists have offered
meta-theories that compete with the law and economics creditor-centered
theories.  Daniel Korobkin, drawing on the paradigm of the hypothetical
choice situation developed by John Rawls, imagines bankruptcy as mirror-
ing a hypothetical bargain among all persons who would be affected by
financial distress, not just shareholders and creditors; under the “veil of
ignorance,” unaware of their respective legal positions, these persons
would be expected to design a fair system.123  Lynn Lopucki, adopting
Blair and Stout’s team production theory, argues that a model in which “a
bankruptcy firm should honor its obligations to all [“team members”] who
made firm-specific investments at the invitation of the firm,” even if those
investments were not directly contracted for, is “superior to the
[c]reditors’ [b]argain [t]heory” as both a positive and normative
matter.124
Other traditionalist scholars have proposed significant changes to the
Bankruptcy Code in order to give non-creditor stakeholders a more direct
and active role.  In her 1997 book, Failure and Forgiveness: Rebalancing the
Bankruptcy System,125 Karen Gross proposes that if a community affected by
a bankruptcy can show a nexus with the bankruptcy that causes substantial
and redressable injury, the community should have a right to be heard in
119. See Warren, supra note 94, at 355.
120. See id. (acknowledging, however, that such stakeholder interests are indi-
rect and derivative, and that such stakeholders “have no specific right to be heard
in the bankruptcy case”).
121. See Warren, supra note 111, at 788.
122. See id. at 811; see also David Carlson, Philosophy in Bankruptcy, 85 MICH. L.
REV. 1341, 1357 (1987).
123. See Korobkin, supra note 104, at 560, 571 n.150.
124. See Lynn M. LoPucki, A Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganiza-
tion, 57 VAND. L. REV. 741, 745, 770 (2004).
125. KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY
SYSTEM (1997).
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the proceeding.126  Any plan of reorganization must then take into ac-
count the interests of such a community, unless the balance of equities
clearly favors denying those interests.127  Similarly, Nathalie Martin has
proposed expanding the scope of parties with standing in bankruptcy
cases beyond “person[s] with a pecuniary interest in the debtor or its as-
sets.”128  Martin suggests that those with “[s]ubstantial nonpecuniary inter-
ests” involving a bankruptcy case should have standing to be heard in the
adjudication of “major events in a case” including “plan confirmation, the
sale of all or substantially all of a debtor’s assets, and the rejection of an
executory contract or unexpired lease.”129
Scholars outside of the United States have likewise advocated for
greater recognition of stakeholder rights in other bankruptcy regimes.
Janis Sarra, also drawing from Blair and Stout’s team production theory,
has proposed a conceptual framework for reconciling stakeholder inter-
ests in Canadian bankruptcy proceedings.  Sarra attempts to avoid a vague
balancing standard by re-conceptualizing the purpose of bankruptcy as
“enterprise value maximization,” with enterprise value taking into account
not just equity and debt, but also equitable investments, such as human
capital investments, costs of environmental harm, costs to communities
from lost trade, and any other “spin-off economic effects of firm fail-
ure.”130  Sarra suggests that the values of these investments are capable of
rough measurement, although Sarra provides little guidance as to how
they actually should be calculated.131  In the United Kingdom, Vanessa
Finch has argued that power in insolvency law requires “democratically
legitimate objectives (or mandates),” and, therefore, must address broader
communitarian concerns in addition to creditor concerns.132  Finch artic-
ulates a set of explicit values, including “efficiency, expertise, accountabil-
ity, and fairness,” as the “benchmarks with which to evaluate” bankruptcy
systems.133
4. Criticisms of Traditionalist Theories of Bankruptcy
Law and economics scholars have criticized traditionalist theories rec-
ognizing stakeholder interests on several grounds.  One of the more com-
pelling arguments is that traditionalists fail to explain adequately why
126. See id. at 227–31.
127. See id.  For a criticism of Gross’s proposal, see Barry S. Schermer, Response
to Professor Gross: Taking the Interests of the Community into Account in Bankruptcy—A
Modern-Day Tale of Belling the Cat, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1049, 1050–52 (1994) (arguing
bankruptcy judges could not practically weigh community interests).
128. See Nathalie D. Martin, Noneconomic Interests in Bankruptcy: Standing on the
Outside Looking In, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 429, 432 n.8 (1998).
129. Id. at 502–03.
130. See SARRA, supra note 98, at 90.
131. See id. at 96.
132. See VANESSA FINCH, CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW: PERSPECTIVES AND PRIN-
CIPLES 53 (2002).
133. See id. at 56, 65.
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certain non-legal rights of stakeholders and distributional considerations
should be observed in bankruptcy if they may be ignored outside of bank-
ruptcy.  For example, a solvent firm need not consult the local community
were it to decide to close down and move overseas, causing distress to the
workers who lose their jobs and the local economy.134  Critics argue that it
is not the job of bankruptcy law to address “distributional concerns” of
such nature if they are not otherwise legally recognized and that doing so
“invites troublesome forum shopping.”135  Law and economics scholars
have further criticized specific proposals to give greater “recognition of
community interests” in bankruptcy on the grounds that reorganizing
firms for the community’s benefit inequitably imposes costs on creditors
and shareholders, that more efficient outcomes would result if communi-
ties wishing firms to remain in place paid subsidies for them to do so, and
that the imprecise standards of “balancing” approaches would lead to “ad
hoc intervention by bankruptcy judges.”136
B. Applying Bankruptcy Theory to Benefit Corporations
The debate in corporate governance literature over the primacy of
the shareholder wealth maximization norm mirrors the debate in bank-
ruptcy literature over the primacy of the creditor wealth maximization
norm.  In both cases, scholars have disputed both the extent to which ex-
isting law already permits recognition of the interests of other non-share-
holder or non-creditor stakeholders and the extent to which the law
should recognize these interests as a normative matter.  However, the cor-
porate governance debate is unique in that critics of the shareholder
wealth maximization norm actually produced legislative change to break
away from the norm.  First, in the 1980s, proponents of constituency stat-
utes sought to alter, or at least clarify, the understanding of the share-
holder wealth maximization norm as a matter of general applicability for
all corporations.137  Then, in recent years, proponents of benefit corpora-
tion statutes took a much different tact.  Rather than reform corporate
governance law generally, they sought to create an opportunity for foun-
ders and investors to opt into a different corporate governance regime in
the event it more closely matches their preferences.138  In essence, the
passage of benefit corporation legislation transformed the shareholder
wealth maximization norm from a mandatory rule to a default rule that
parties may contract out of by electing a social enterprise legal form.
134. See Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A
Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 829 (1987).
135. See id. at 818–19.
136. See Marjorie L. Girth, Rethinking Fairness in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 73 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 449, 473–75 (1999); see also Schwartz, supra note 106, at 1817–18.
137. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
138. See supra Section II.D.
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Similar legislative change has not occurred in the post-1978 bank-
ruptcy context.139  This may be explained in part by contrasting notions of
what reform means in academic debates over the shareholder wealth max-
imization norm and the creditor wealth maximization norm, respectively.
Critics of traditional corporate law argue that the law should become less
shareholder-centric.  On the other hand, since the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978, the debate in bankruptcy academia has largely been between law
and economics critics arguing that bankruptcy law does not do enough to
support a strict creditor wealth maximization norm, and traditionalists de-
fending the nuances of the existing legal regime.140  Nevertheless, there
has also been a vocal group of critics who could be categorized as tradi-
tionalist but advocate for reform and argue that bankruptcy law should
move further away from creditor wealth maximization toward a system that
better recognizes the needs of multiple stakeholders.141  These critics
could benefit from taking a page out of the book of the social enterprise
movement and attempt to turn the bankruptcy regime’s creditor wealth
maximization norm, such as it is, into a default rule that may be con-
tracted out of.
1. Law and Economics-Based Proposals for Contract-Based Bankruptcy Systems
Reforming bankruptcy law to allow parties to contract out of a pure
creditor wealth maximization norm finds theoretical support, ironically, in
the proposals of certain law and economics bankruptcy theorists.  Robert
Rasmussen proposes that parties should have flexibility “to choose [the]
bankruptcy scheme” that will apply to them on the basis that different
bankruptcy schemes may be superior under different circumstances.142
He argues that, contrary to the existing legal regime, most bankruptcy law
should consist of default, rather than mandatory, rules.143  Under his pro-
posed system, a firm would be required to select from a defined menu of
bankruptcy systems upon its formation, and by designating that choice in
its charter, the firm and its consensual creditors would effectively contract
into a particular bankruptcy regime.144  Consensual creditors would make
lending decisions in part on the basis of which “menu option” is chosen,
139. See supra notes 119–21 and accompanying text regarding the progressive
nature of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.
140. The moniker “traditionalist” is telling.
141. See, e.g., supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text; see also Donald R.
Korobkin, Employee Interests in Bankruptcy, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 26–33
(1996).
142. See Rasmussen, supra note 106, at 53–54, 112.
143. See id. at 67.
144. See id. at 100–07.  Rasmussen proposes four options: the first would “en-
able [a] firm to commit to never filing a bankruptcy petition under federal bank-
ruptcy law”, the second “would enable [a] firm to file a Chapter 7 petition only,”
the third “would stay all creditors except for [a] financing creditor,” and the
fourth would “allow [a] firm to create its own bankruptcy regime, subject to the
restraint that it [cannot alter the rights of] nonconsensual creditors.”  Id.
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offering a higher or lower interest rate depending on their expected re-
turn given the chosen bankruptcy system.145  The rights of nonconsensual
creditors, on the other hand, would be set by mandatory rules.146
With a similar focus on increasing the efficiency of bankruptcy out-
comes through a system of default rules, Alan Schwartz proposes a system
of ex ante bankruptcy contracting akin to Rasmussen’s menu approach
but with greater flexibility in certain respects.147  Schwartz argues that set-
ting a chosen bankruptcy system in a firm’s charter “may
founder . . . because the optimality of a [given] system is state-dependent
[and] . . . time-dependent,” and “corporate charters are inconvenient to
amend.”148  Instead, Schwartz proposes a system in which firms contract
with creditors as to choice-of-bankruptcy systems directly in their lending
agreements.149  When entering into a lending agreement, a firm and its
creditors would choose from among three contract types, each with a dif-
ferent approach to designating, or not designating, the choice of bank-
ruptcy system.150  To account for changes over time as to which system
may be preferable, Schwartz proposes that a debtor’s last lending agree-
ment negotiated before bankruptcy will be binding on all other credi-
tors—e.g., it will automatically convert all previous agreements to the same
construct.151  To account for conflicts among creditor preferences,
Schwartz argues that strict enforcement of the absolute priority rule
should address most conflicts because most creditors will be aligned to
maximize overall returns, and the risk of trade creditors favoring reorgani-
zation even when it is inefficient overall would be addressed by a majority
vote rule aggregating all creditors.152
145. See id. at 101–19.
146. See id. at 67.
147. Schwartz’s approach includes only two alternative bankruptcy systems to
chose from, but is more flexible in the sense that choices may be state-dependent
and time-dependent. See infra text accompanying notes 148–52.
148. See Schwartz, supra note 106, at 1811.
149. See id. at 1811, 1823 (stating “[t]wo bankruptcy system options are as-
sumed to exist,” with one much like Chapter 11 and another providing for sale of
insolvent firms or their assets at auction).
150. The first, termed a “renegotiation proof contract,” authorizes the firm to
keep a negotiated portion of the monetary return that would be generated by
whatever bankruptcy system it chooses, thereby bribing the debtor to choose the
more efficient system by aligning its interests with its creditors. See id.  at 1827–30.
The second, termed a “renegotiation contract,” does not specify a given bank-
ruptcy system and the debtor is free to choose the bankruptcy system it prefers. See
id. at 1830.  The third, termed a “partially renegotiation-proof contract,” would
designate the preferred bankruptcy system on the basis of an outside signal and
could be renegotiated if the signal fails to predict an appropriate system. See id. at
1830–31.
151. See id. at 1834.
152. See id. at 1838.
27
Brown: When Social Enterprises Fail
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2017
54 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62: p. 27
2. Contract-Based Bankruptcy System for Benefit Corporations
There are several possible approaches for allowing parties to opt out
of the creditor wealth maximization norm into a more stakeholder-
friendly regime.  Following the Rasmussen model, corporations could des-
ignate in their charters that they elect to be subject to a specified stake-
holder-friendly regime, thereby effectively contracting with all future
consensual creditors by putting them on notice.  This choice may be tied
to a corporation’s decision to be a benefit corporation, or it could be en-
tirely disconnected from its corporate form, recognizing the possibility
that a firm could prefer a stakeholder-friendly bankruptcy regime without
wanting to be a benefit corporation, or vice-versa.  Or, following the model
advocated by Schwartz, corporations could expressly contract with credi-
tors in lending agreements as to their choice of regime in this respect.
This choice would not necessarily have to be confined to two possible re-
gimes but could extend to a range of bankruptcy systems with varying
treatments of stakeholders.
Although a more nuanced system for contracting around issues of
stakeholder rights in bankruptcy has some theoretical allure, the most fea-
sible and justifiable system is to tie this election directly to benefit corpora-
tion status.  First, a firm’s identity as a benefit corporation makes the
choice of bankruptcy regimes far more salient both to the firm itself and
to its creditors.  The decision of whether to incorporate as a benefit corpo-
ration is an opportunity for founders and investors to deeply consider the
various legal implications of their choice, including issues of stakeholder
rights in bankruptcy.  While financial creditors should in theory perform
the diligence required to understand the bankruptcy implications of a bor-
rower’s charter provisions in any event, a borrower’s status as a benefit
corporation is a highly identifiable signal to all consensual creditors that it
is a firm with unique legal characteristics that may affect creditors’ rights.
Second, more complex systems risk a host of logistical issues that could
challenge the application of a theoretical model to practice.153  Finally,
there is a strong normative argument for tying post-bankruptcy filing
stakeholder rights to pre-bankruptcy stakeholder rights, and vice-versa.  A
central tenet of law and economics arguments is that pre-bankruptcy enti-
tlements should be maintained in bankruptcy.154  One of the strongest
criticisms of proposals to extend additional rights in bankruptcy to stake-
153. For a criticism of Schwartz’s contract system focusing on complexities of
applying the theory to practice, see Lynn M. LoPucki, Contract Bankruptcy: A Reply
to Alan Schwartz, 109 YALE L.J. 317, 326 (1999) and Stephen J. Lubben, Some Realism
About Reorganization: Explaining the Failure of Chapter 11 Theory, 106 DICK. L. REV.
267, 279–85 (2001).
154. See Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the
Creditors’ Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 871 (1982) (“The creditors’ bargain model,
then, provides a satisfying theoretical explanation of why bankruptcy law should
make a fundamental decision to honor negotiated non-bankruptcy
entitlements.”).
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holders is that there is no justification for why such rights may be legiti-
mately ignored outside of bankruptcy—for example, in the hypothetical
scenario of a solvent firm shuttering its local operations and moving over-
seas.  However, a stakeholder-friendly bankruptcy regime for benefit cor-
porations would flip the argument on its head.  Such a system would award
special rights to stakeholders in bankruptcy precisely because they enjoy
similar rights pre-bankruptcy.
A remaining consideration is whether the election of a stakeholder-
friendly bankruptcy regime should be tied to benefit corporation status as
a mandatory or default rule.  A mandatory rule would provide for stronger
signaling power.  If all benefit corporations are subject to the same rules,
consensual creditors should be aware of the implications of lending to a
benefit corporation without a need for any further investigation.  How-
ever, a mandatory rule is at odds with the liberal spirit of social enterprise
legislation, which aims to give firms and their investors greater choice by
allowing them to opt out of the shareholder wealth maximization
norm.155  Certain benefit corporation investors may prefer a more tradi-
tional bankruptcy regime in order to avoid potentially higher debt costs
associated with a stakeholder-friendly regime.  Put differently, they may
have a preference for a benefit corporation legal framework that recog-
nizes stakeholder interests only during times of financial viability.  A
mandatory rule would risk discouraging such a subset of investors from
choosing the benefit corporation form in the first instance.  Further, a
stakeholder-friendly regime can be expected to result in more overall effi-
ciency so long as investors exhibit a preference for accepting the prospect
of higher debt costs in exchange for producing more stakeholder-friendly
bankruptcy outcomes.156  However, for any investors who do not prefer to
make that tradeoff, a mandatory rule could result in a misalignment of
investor preferences with bankruptcy outcomes and therefore potentially
inefficient results.  For these reasons, the more optimal approach is to sub-
ject benefit corporations to a stakeholder-friendly bankruptcy regime as a
default rule that may be opted out of by a charter provision.
Tying a firm’s identity as a benefit corporation to a default rule of a
stakeholder-friendly bankruptcy regime provides a path to a traditionalist-
minded bankruptcy reform that is grounded in a law and economics con-
tract-based theoretical model.  It addresses much of the law and econom-
ics criticism that is otherwise levied towards proposals to make bankruptcy
more community- and stakeholder-friendly.  Traditionalist proposals have
155. See J. William Callison, Putting New Sheets on a Procrustean Bed: How Benefit
Corporations Address Fiduciary Duties, the Dangers Created, and Suggestions for Change, 2
AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 85, 103 (2012) (arguing “benefit corporation concep-
tion . . . starts down the right path [of promoting liberalism] by facilitating
choice,” but that MBCL is “insufficiently liberal” because it requires all benefit
corporations to adopt same general public benefit).  The term “liberal” is used in
this Article in its classic philosophical sense, not in its contemporary political
sense.
156. See infra Section V.C.2 for a more detailed discussion of efficiency issues.
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been criticized for inequitably shifting costs to creditors, but in a benefit
corporation-linked system, consensual creditors will be on notice of the
altered bankruptcy regime and, therefore, price their financing accord-
ingly.157  They have been criticized as inefficient on the basis that efficient
outcomes benefiting communities and stakeholders would be more accu-
rately reached through communities and stakeholders paying subsidies,
rather than judges weighing interests and placing costs on creditors.  But
in a benefit corporation-linked system, the corporation’s investors should
be expected to value the benefits to communities and stakeholders accu-
rately by accepting higher debt costs in exchange for such benefits.158
They have also been criticized for changing pre-bankruptcy entitlements,
but as demonstrated above, a benefit corporation-linked system would, in
fact, seek to preserve the indirect pre-bankruptcy entitlements of stake-
holders.159  The most difficult criticism to address is that proposals for
stakeholder rights are vague and leave judges without standards in balanc-
ing various interests.  Part V of this Article will attempt to address this
point by discussing instances in which bankruptcy courts have already
been tasked with balancing creditor and stakeholder interests and that
serve as a basis for constructing a plausible system for benefit corporation
bankruptcies.
3. Consent Issues Associated with a Contract-Based Bankruptcy System for
Benefit Corporations
Before proceeding with an analysis of what an altered bankruptcy re-
gime for benefit corporations might look like, the theoretical model of
such a regime as a contracted-into system warrants a closer examination.
So long as a creditor is on notice of a company’s status as a benefit corpo-
ration and the attendant bankruptcy implications of that status, the al-
tered regime of creditor rights is effectively one component of a
157. See infra Section IV.B.3 for a discussion of nonconsensual creditors
under such a system.
158. See infra Section V.C.2 for a more detailed discussion of efficiency issues.
159. A notable exception is that, in such a system, stakeholders would be af-
forded indirect entitlements in bankruptcy that they would not necessarily be af-
forded in the context of debt enforcement outside of bankruptcy.  A secured
creditor can typically exercise remedies upon default that include the ability to
satisfy the debt by taking possession of and selling a borrower’s assets or potentially
the borrower itself.  Any concerns about a benefit corporation’s mission being
abandoned as a result of a change of ownership through bankruptcy apply equally
to a change of ownership through the exercise of such non-bankruptcy remedies,
yet creditors exercising such remedies would not be required to do so in a manner
that takes into account stakeholder interests.  However, a benefit corporation
could potentially contract around this mismatch to some extent by negotiating for
stakeholder-friendly protections in its credit documents.  Further, a benefit corpo-
ration in default and facing the prospect of a seizure of collateral would always
have the option of filing a voluntary petition and availing itself of the protections
of the Bankruptcy Code.  Protections include the automatic stay of enforcement
and, assuming it did not opt out, the stakeholder-friendly provisions of the pro-
posed benefit corporation bankruptcy regime.
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bargained-for set of terms comprising the contractual arrangement be-
tween the company and the creditor.160  To the extent a creditor views the
regime as decreasing the expected value of its return in a downside scena-
rio, the creditor may demand a higher interest rate or other creditor-
favorable terms, or simply choose not to transact with the benefit corpora-
tion.  This justification holds for true consensual financial creditors but
breaks down for nonconsensual creditors, consensual creditors who can-
not be expected to be on notice of benefit corporation status and its bank-
ruptcy implications, and creditors who extend credit prior to a company’s
conversion to a benefit corporation form without such creditors’ consent.
A creditor intending to lend any material amount can be expected to
perform basic due diligence on the borrower’s legal status.  If a company’s
status as a benefit corporation is not already immediately apparent, a
lender and its counsel would soon learn of it through legal due diligence
as they review the company’s charter.161  It is conceivable that a lender
could extend credit without learning of such identity or appreciating its
significance for purposes of creditors’ rights, but that should hardly ex-
cuse the consequences of such failure.  A financing creditor is generally
expected to mitigate these risks through due diligence and requiring con-
tractual representations from the borrower.
In contrast, insofar as a unique bankruptcy regime for benefit corpo-
rations alters the treatment of a nonconsensual creditor in bankruptcy, it
cannot be seen as an ex ante bargain between the firm and the noncon-
sensual creditor.  An individual hit by a truck owned by a benefit corpora-
tion does not choose to have a claim against a benefit corporation, as
opposed to a traditional corporation, and does not bargain for a different
set of legal rights.  Certain non-financial consensual creditors are more
difficult to categorize.  Theoretically, a customer with a small contract
claim is a consensual creditor, but it may not be reasonable to expect such
a creditor to know that a company is a benefit corporation or appreciate
the legal significance of that corporate status.  Finally, any transaction be-
tween a creditor and a traditional for-profit corporation that later be-
comes a benefit corporation, absent the creditor’s consent to the
conversion, cannot be viewed as an ex ante bargaining regarding the legal
implications of benefit corporation status.
There are two possible approaches for addressing the challenge of
creditor consent to a benefit corporation’s bankruptcy regime.  The first is
160. This presupposes that benefit corporation forms do not supplant tradi-
tional corporate forms entirely and that for-profit businesses remain subject to the
rules of the existing bankruptcy regime.
161. A lender would in all likelihood be aware of a borrower’s status as a
benefit corporation even before commencing standard legal due diligence, given
that such status would likely be marketed by the company. See Dana Brakman Rei-
ser, Benefit Corporation—A Sustainable Form of Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
591, 622 (2011) (citing branding as one key reason to adopt social enterprise
form).
31
Brown: When Social Enterprises Fail
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2017
58 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62: p. 27
to design a bankruptcy regime with different treatment for creditors that
depends on whether a creditor should have been, or in fact was, aware of a
company’s status as a benefit corporation and the implications thereof.
Such an approach would preserve the integrity of the ex ante bargaining
theoretical justification in all circumstances, but it would likely prove too
complex and unwieldy to be workable.  Determining whether a creditor
should have been aware of certain facts and their legal implications re-
quires either fact-specific inquiries that are ripe for dispute or bright-line
rules that risk arbitrariness.  Looking instead to whether a creditor was
aware of certain facts would prove even more challenging and create a
perverse incentive for creditors to be willfully ignorant.  Even drawing a
bright line between all consensual creditors and nonconsensual creditors
would vastly complicate benefit corporation bankruptcy proceedings, ef-
fectively resulting in the claims of nonconsensual creditors becoming se-
nior to other unsecured claims in a limited respect.162
The better approach is for the rules not to distinguish between credi-
tors on the basis of whether they should have been, or were, aware of a
debtor’s benefit corporation status.  Such an approach does not perfectly
fit an ex ante bargaining model, but it is far simpler to administer and is
consistent with existing rules regarding nonprofit and railroad bankrupt-
cies.  The hypothetical nonconsensual creditor injured by a truck may end
up with significantly different returns in bankruptcy depending on
whether the truck was owned by a for-profit supermarket, a nonprofit hos-
pital, or a railroad company.163  Similarly, consensual creditors like ven-
dors and customers may be entirely unaware of the bankruptcy
implications of a transaction with, for example, a nonprofit hospital versus
a for-profit hospital.  These differences are not justified by a theoretical
model of different bankruptcy laws serving as an ex ante bargain among
parties, but that is not the only possible justification for the rules.  The
Bankruptcy Code provides special rules for nonprofits and railroads be-
cause of recognized policy objectives protecting the public interest, and
those objectives outweigh any concerns about unbargained-for disparate
treatment of creditors.164  Putting entity type aside, nonconsensual credi-
tors face widely different outcomes based on factors entirely outside of
their control.165  The appropriate treatment of nonconsensual debtors in
bankruptcy is outside the scope of this Article and is the subject of exten-
162. Rasmussen’s menu option model acknowledges the issue of nonconsen-
sual creditors and concludes that, unlike consensual creditors, they should be sub-
ject only to mandatory bankruptcy rules. See supra note 106 and accompanying
text.  However, Rasmussen does not address how to account for the different out-
comes for nonconsensual creditors that may indirectly result from bargaining for
different bankruptcy systems.
163. See infra Section V.A.
164. See id.
165. For example, a tort claimant may receive no return from a debtor with
secured debt exceeding the debtor’s enterprise value or may receive a substantial
return from a debtor with little consensual debt.
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sive academic debate.166  It suffices to say that the unbargained-for dispa-
rate treatment of nonconsensual creditors is not unique to the system
proposed for benefit corporations in this Article, but it is a hallmark of
existing bankruptcy law.
On closer inspection, a system that ignores issues of consent may pro-
duce fewer inequitable results than might otherwise be assumed.  Noncon-
sensual creditors typically account for a relatively small portion of the
claims in a business bankruptcy.  When they play a larger role, it is often in
the case of a mass tort situation—for example, a bankrupt company with
large asbestos liability.  In such a case, the stakeholder mandates of benefit
corporations may actually benefit such creditors.  The MBCL requires
“community and societal factors” to be taken into account in all decisions,
which could potentially result in more favorable treatment for tort credi-
tors where the claims are aligned with general societal concerns about
public safety.167  Similarly, to the extent non-financial consensual credi-
tors are employees or customers, they too would benefit from the applica-
tion of the MBCL’s stakeholder provisions in bankruptcy.
Finally, the issue of companies converting to benefit corporation sta-
tus after a consensual debt has already been incurred can be protected
against contractually.  Credit agreements for large lending transactions
typically contain covenants restricting borrowers from amending their
charter documents in a manner that is adverse to their lenders, provisions
that could, depending on their formulation, bar a conversion to benefit
corporation status if it were to implicate a less creditor-friendly bankruptcy
regime.  To the extent such provisions are not currently universal for all
lending transactions, a unique bankruptcy regime for benefit corporations
would likely result in lenders demanding such protections more
frequently.
V. PROPOSAL FOR BENEFIT CORPORATION TREATMENT IN BANKRUPTCY
Section IV.B developed a theoretical framework for benefit corpora-
tions and their creditors to effectively contract into a stakeholder-friendly
bankruptcy regime as a default rule.  This Part will set forth a proposal for
the rules of such a regime.  First, this Part will review instances where the
Bankruptcy Code currently gives special consideration to public interest
concerns with respect to certain types of debtors, reviewing the treatment
166. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Share-
holder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1902 (1991) (proposing unlim-
ited shareholder liability for tort claims, combined with priority of both secured
and unsecured consensual claims over tort claims); David W. Leebron, Limited Lia-
bility, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1643–49 (1991) (propos-
ing that tort claims take priority over all consensual claims); Christopher M.E.
Painter, Note, Tort Creditor Priority in the Secured Credit System: Asbestos Times, the Worst
of Times, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1080–83 (1984) (proposing that tort claims take
priority over all consensual claims).
167. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 301(a)(1) (B LAB 2016).
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of nonprofits and railroads in bankruptcy.  Then, it will propose specific
amendments to both the Bankruptcy Code and benefit corporation stat-
utes to implement a unique stakeholder-friendly bankruptcy regime for
benefit corporations.  Finally, this Part will analyze the ex ante efficiency
implications of such proposal.
A. Examples of Organizations with Unique Bankruptcy Treatment
For an indication of how bankruptcy law might give more credence to
stakeholder and public interest concerns with respect to certain types of
debtors, look no further than the existing provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code.  Nonprofits are treated differently than for-profit businesses in a
number of critical ways, which is particularly significant in that the benefit
corporation form is often viewed as a hybrid of nonprofit and for-profit
principles.168  Further, railroad reorganizations have their own unique
treatment under the Bankruptcy Code, providing a compelling approach
for recognizing stakeholder interests that is similar in spirit but distinct in
method from the nonprofit approach.
1. Nonprofits in Bankruptcy
a. Involuntary Filings and Conversion to Chapter 7
Nonprofit organizations receive privileged treatment under the Bank-
ruptcy Code, promoting business continuity at the expense of creditors’
rights.  The Bankruptcy Code does not permit creditors to commence in-
voluntary bankruptcy cases against “a farmer, family farmer or a corpora-
tion that is not a moneyed, business or commercial corporation.”169  For
the sake of simplicity, this Article refers to a “corporation that is not a
moneyed, business or commercial corporation” as a “nonprofit.”170  Simi-
larly, unlike in the case of a for-profit debtor, a bankruptcy court cannot
168. See, e.g., Katherine R. Lofft, Purvi B. Maniar & Tamar R. Rosenberg, Are
Hybrids Really More Efficient? A ‘Drive-by’ Analysis of Alternative Company Structures,
2012 BUS. L. TODAY 1.
169. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2012).  Voluntary petitions for bankruptcy, on
the other hand, may generally be filed by any association “that resides or has a
domicile, place of business, or property in the United States,” including nonprofit
organizations. See 11 U.S.C. § 109; see also id. §§ 101(9)A, 101(41), 301 (2012).
170. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(a).  The Bankruptcy Code does not define the term
“corporation that is not a moneyed, business, or commercial corporation.” See id.
The legislative history of § 303 includes a statement that “churches, schools, and
charitable organizations and foundations [are protected] from involuntary bank-
ruptcy.” See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 321 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6278.  Some courts have applied a “state classification rule” such that an
organization qualifies if it is registered with its state of organization as a nonprofit,
and others have applied a more nuanced “corporate activity rule” under which the
“nature of an entity’s activities” is reviewed in addition to its “classification under
state law.” See James Lockhart, What Constitutes “Moneyed, Business, or Commercial
Corporation” Subject to Involuntary Bankruptcy or Reorganization upon Creditors’ Petition
Under 11 U.S.C.A. § 303(a) and Predecessor Statutes, 24 A.L.R. FED. 2d 397, §§ 7–8, 12
(2007).
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convert a nonprofit debtor’s Chapter 11 case into a Chapter 7 case without
the nonprofit debtor’s consent.171  In combination, these rules constitute
a critical difference in bankruptcy regimes for nonprofit debtors and for-
profit debtors.  A nonprofit debtor cannot be forced to liquidate its assets,
and therefore, a nonprofit in financial distress is assured that it can survive
if it so chooses.
b. Dispositions of Nonprofit Property
The law of nonprofit bankruptcies is also distinguished by the unique
considerations that factor into the disposition of a charitable nonprofit
debtor’s property.  In addition to the traditional fiduciary duties of care
and loyalty, nonprofit directors are subject to a “duty of obedience,” which
requires “that a director act with fidelity, within the bounds of the law
generally, to the organization’s ‘mission,’ as expressed in its charter and
by-laws.”172  For charitable nonprofits, these fiduciary duties may be en-
forced by state attorney generals, who have broad oversight over charitable
organizations under the doctrine of parens patriae.173  Recognizing that in
such capacity attorney generals have an interest in how charitable assets
are disposed, the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act of 1987
(RMNCA),174 which forms the basis for the nonprofit corporation statutes
in twenty-six states,175 requires twenty-day advance notice to the attorney
general before a public benefit corporation176 or religious corporation
may sell, lease, exchange, or otherwise dispose of all, or substantially all, of
its property.177  Although direct approval of the attorney general is not
required under such a provision, the RMNCA gives attorney generals
171. See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(c) (2012).
172. See Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and
Officers: Paradoxes, Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L. 631, 641 (1998)
(quoting DANIEL L. KURTZ, BOARD LIABILITY: GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT DIRECTORS 21
(1988)).
173. See Terri Lynn Helge, Policing the Good Guys: Regulation of the Charitable
Sector Through a Federal Charity Oversight Board, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1,
11–13 (2009) (“Government enforcement of charities is rooted in the English
common law power of parens patriae, which imposes on the representative of the
sovereign the exclusive duty to enforce charitable trusts.”).
174. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT (AM. BAR ASS’N 1987).
175. See Michael E. Malamut, Summary of Sources of State Nonprofit Corporation
Laws, NAT’L PARLIAMENTARIAN, Second Quarter 2008, at 8, 8.
176. The RMNCA distinguishes between religious corporations, public benefit
corporations, and mutual benefit corporations as three categories of nonprofit
corporations.  Religious corporations are corporations organized for religious pur-
poses.  Public benefit corporations are corporations that are exempt under
§ 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code or otherwise have public or charitable
purposes.  Finally, mutual benefit corporations encompass any other nonprofit
corporations. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 17.07.  The term “public
benefit corporation” has a different meaning as used in the Delaware, Colorado,
and Minnesota social enterprise statutes, which is discussed supra in note 56 and
accompanying text.
177. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 12.02(g).
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standing to seek injunctive relief for proceedings for which they are re-
quired to be given notice.178  The New York Not-for-Profit Corporation
Law179 provides a stricter standard, requiring a charitable nonprofit pro-
posing to dispose of all or substantially all of its assets to obtain the ap-
proval of the attorney general or applicable state court by means of a
petition that sets forth, among other requirements, that “the purposes of
the corporation, or the interests of its members will be promoted
thereby.”180
Prior to the Bankruptcy Code providing any specific guidance on the
issue, courts recognized public interest- and mission-related considera-
tions regarding the disposition of charitable assets when adjudicating non-
profit bankruptcies.  In In re Brethren Care of South Bend, Inc.,181 a nonprofit
debtor “whose primary asset [was] a retirement and nursing care facility,”
proposed a sale of all its assets to another nonprofit.182  The court ap-
proved the debtor’s proposed sale over the objections of creditors who
proposed a competing plan yielding a higher return (but possibly result-
ing in a for-profit corporation operating the facility), holding that “the
continuing satisfaction and ongoing beneficial treatment of the re-
sidents . . . is a good business reason for the sale.”183  In In re United Health-
care Systems Inc.,184 a nonprofit hospital debtor supported a sale of all its
assets to a bidder chosen in a pre-bankruptcy filing bidding process, not-
withstanding that there was a second potential bidder who may have been
willing to pay a higher price.185  The bankruptcy court had denied the
debtor’s request for approval of the sale, holding that the board of direc-
tors failed to exercise proper business judgment by accepting the offer
and not providing “the opportunity to take higher and better offers.”186
The district court reversed the decision, finding that the board “exercised
sound business judgment” in considering factors other than price in as-
sessing the offer, including that the chosen bidder was the only potential
bidder “committed to keeping the [ ] [h]ospital in one location and to
providing $5 million in future investments.”187  Citing In re Brethren Care,
the district court held that the bankruptcy court should have considered
that the debtor was a charitable institution and that the “officers and direc-
tors of a non-profit organization are charged with the fiduciary obligation
to act in furtherance of [that] organization’s charitable mission.”188
178. See id. § 1.70.
179. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 511(a)(6) (Consol. 2016).
180. See id. § 511(a)(6) (Consol. 2016); see also id. §§ 510(a)(3), 511-a.
181. 98 B.R. 927 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989).
182. See id. at 928–31.
183. See id. at 935.
184. No. 97-1159, 1997 WL 176574 (D.N.J. 1997).
185. See id. at *1–3.
186. See id. at *3.
187. See id. at *5–6.
188. See id. at *5.
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In 2005, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act (BAPCPA) codified the deference to the public policy considerations
associated with nonprofits.189  BAPCPA enacted several new provisions in
the Bankruptcy Code specifying that transfers of property by nonprofit
debtors, including those in the context of plans of reorganization and 11
U.S.C. § 363 asset sales, are subject to applicable state law and other re-
strictions on nonprofits.190  Further, the BAPCPA section effecting such
changes contains an uncodified provision stating that “[t]he parties who
may appear and be heard in a proceeding under this section include the
attorney general of the State in which the debtor is incorporated, was
formed, or does business.”191  Taken together, the BAPCPA nonprofit
provisions expressly prioritize states’ interests in subjecting dispositions of
charitable assets to the oversight of attorney generals and other restric-
tions over the interests of creditors in disposing of assets in a manner re-
sulting in the highest recovery on claims.192
189. See Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
190. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(d)(1) (2012) (providing trustee may sell or lease
property under subsection (b) or (c) of that section only in accordance with appli-
cable non-bankruptcy law that governs transfer of property by nonprofit); id.
§ 541(f) (providing nonprofit exempt from taxation pursuant to § 501(c)(3) of
Internal Revenue Code may transfer assets to non-exempt corporation, but only
under same conditions that would apply if debtor had not filed bankruptcy case);
id. § 1129(a)(16) (requiring bankruptcy court, in confirming Chapter 11 plan, to
find all transfers of property under plan are made in accordance with applicable
non-bankruptcy law that governs transfer of property by nonprofit).
191. See Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 1221(d), 119 Stat. at 196.
192. However, notwithstanding BAPCPA’s broad language subjecting all
transfers of property to non-bankruptcy law restrictions, difficult questions may
arise when applying the rule to transfers sought by creditors without the debtor’s
consent.  In In re Machne Menachem, the bankruptcy court held that the applicable
restrictions on transfer in the New York Not-for-Profit Law applied only to volun-
tary transfers of assets by a nonprofit debtor and were therefore not contemplated
by Section 1129(a)(16) in the context of a creditor-proposed plan. See In re
Machne Menachem, Inc., 371 B.R. 63, 68 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2006).  A creditor had
proposed a plan of reorganization involving a transfer of assets to a third party to
which the debtor objected. See id. at 65.  The applicable New York law required
approval of two-thirds of the board of directors of the nonprofit corporation for
any “sale, lease, exchange or other disposition of all or substantially all, of the
assets of a [not-for-profit] corporation.” See id. at 68 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 510 (McKinney 2006)).  The
court reasoned that “to read the phrase ‘other disposition’ as encompassing invol-
untary transfers of corporate property . . . . would lead to an absurd result . . . .
[because] creditors could not foreclose on a not-for-profit’s property” without first
obtaining approval from the debtor’s own board of directors. See id.  While the
decision rested on an interpretation of the specific state law restriction, rather
than of Section 1129(a)(16), the court’s strict reading of the state law suggests that
the provisions introduced by the BAPCPA may not always protect nonprofit public
policy considerations in the case of creditor-driven dispositions of property.
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c. Overall Effect of Nonprofit Bankruptcy Regime
In their unique treatment under the Bankruptcy Code, nonprofits are
subject to a bankruptcy regime that clearly rejects creditor wealth max-
imization as its sole objective.  Law and economics scholars often focus on
the optimality under various scenarios of collecting debts through bank-
ruptcy versus outside of bankruptcy and of preserving a firm as a reorga-
nized going concern versus liquidating its assets.193  By placing the
decision-making as to both outcomes entirely with the nonprofit debtor,
the nonprofit bankruptcy regime favors the protection and continuation
of insolvent nonprofits over economic efficiency.  Similarly, the deference
to mission-related considerations in the context of the disposition of non-
profit property, as codified by BAPCPA, subordinates the interests of a
nonprofit’s creditors to the interests of its constituents under state law in
ensuring its property is applied for charitable purposes.  Together, these
provisions comprise a regime that values the rehabilitation and preserva-
tion of financially distressed nonprofit firms over efficient debt collection.
2. Railroads in Bankruptcy
a. Railroad Bankruptcies Prior to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
Railroads have long received singular treatment under bankruptcy
law, reflecting a public policy goal of protecting the public interest when a
railroad business fails.194  Prior to 1933, railroad bankruptcies were
brought as equity receiverships, which involved foreclosing and selling a
railroad debtor’s property to a new company formed for that sole purpose
and generally consisting of the railroad debtor’s secured creditors.195
This process was heavily criticized on a number of accounts, although it
did have the overarching benefit that “the equity receivership procedure
[generally] did not interfere with railroad service to the public.”196  In
1933, bankruptcy relief was first made available to railroads pursuant to
193. See Lubben, supra note 153, at 287, 291–92 (observing many law and eco-
nomics bankruptcy frameworks “ultimately boil down to proposals to liquidate the
debtor” on basis of higher efficiency and critiquing theories as reflecting incom-
plete “understanding of Chapter 11” in practice).  For further discussion of law
and economics scholars focus on the optimality under various scenarios of collect-
ing debts through bankruptcy versus outside of bankruptcy, see supra note 101 and
accompanying text.
194. See, e.g., Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 135 (1881) (“[T]he cessation of
[a railroad’s] business for a day would be a [public] injury.  A railroad is author-
ized to be constructed more for the public good to be subserved, than for private
gain . . . .  It is, therefore, a matter of public right by which the courts, when they
take possession of the property, authorize the receiver or other officer in whose
charge it is placed to carry on in the usual way those active operations for which it
was designed and constructed, so that the public may not suffer detriment by the
non-user of the franchises.”).
195. See Charles Jordon Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United
States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 21–22 (1995).
196. See Julie A. Veach, Note, On Considering the Public Interest in Bankruptcy:
Looking to the Railroads for Answers, 72 IND. L.J. 1211, 1216 (1997).
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Section 77 of the former Bankruptcy Act.  Congress insisted that the law
provide for the protection of the public interest in railroad reorganiza-
tions, and it did so by making the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
the arbiter of the public interest in this respect.197  Any reorganization
plan was subject to the approval of the ICC, which was required to con-
sider the compatibility of the plan with the public interest, among other
factors.  The “singular treatment accorded railroads in the Act” reflected
their “central role [ ] in the nation’s economy” and their role as the pri-
mary means of long-distance transportation.198  In particular, “[b]ecause
one railroad’s track was linked to that of another railroad,” the failure of a
single railroad could have a nationwide “ripple effect.”199
In applying Section 77, courts consistently recognized the importance
of promoting the public interest, with an evolving view on how to balance
that goal with the interests of creditors.  In the 1940s, courts held that,
“regardless of the interests of creditors,” rail service must “be continued
for the benefit of the public.”200  In the following decades, courts “took a
more moderate position.”201  In the New Haven Inclusion Cases,202 the Su-
preme Court summarized the “two basis objectives” of Section 77 as “the
conservation of the debtor’s assets for the benefit of creditors and the
preservation of an ongoing railroad in the public interest.”203  The case
involved the proposed inclusion of the New Haven Railroad, a long-strug-
gling railroad in a Section 77 reorganization proceeding, in “the merger
of the Pennsylvania and New York Central railroads.”204  As a condition to
the merger, the ICC required that the merging entities purchase the New
Haven railroad so as to sustain its operations, finding that a termination of
service would lead to significant distress in the region.205  Its creditors ar-
gued that the erosion of the debtor’s estate due to its continued operation
in the lengthy reorganization proceeding constituted an unconstitutional
taking of their property.206  The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that
the creditors “invested their capital in a public utility that does owe an
obligation to the public,” and that “[by] their entry into a railroad enter-
prise, [the security holders] assumed the risk that in any depression or any
reorganization the interests of the public would be considered as well as
197. The ICC was a federal regulatory commission with oversight authority
over railroads. See Arthur Donovan, Intermodal Transportation in Historical Perspec-
tive, 27 TRANSP. L.J. 317, 330 (2000).  It was replaced by the Surface Transportation
Board in 1995. See id. at 343.
198. See 6 NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. 3d § 117:2.
199. See GROSS, supra note 125, at 219.
200. See Veach, supra note 196, at 1219 (discussing cases).
201. See id.
202. 399 U.S. 392 (1970).
203. See New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392, 398 (1970); Veach, supra
note 196, at 1219.
204. See New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. at 398.
205. See id. at 406.
206. See id. at 490.
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theirs.”207  Thus, the application of Section 77 came to embody a balanc-
ing of the public interest with the interest of creditors, with courts recog-
nizing the ex ante implications of such approach.208
b. Railroad Bankruptcies After the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
With the overhaul of the bankruptcy law system effected by the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Section 77 was replaced by Subchapter IV of
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.209  The new regime maintained the
emphasis on recognizing the public interest in railroad reorganizations,
but it differed from its predecessor in several important respects.  Most
critically, it permitted liquidation of railroads, which was not available
under Section 77, and it generally took the authority to enforce the public
interest from the ICC and placed it in the hands of the court and the
bankruptcy trustee.210  The court, and the trustee in certain situations, is
tasked with weighing the public interest211 in railroad reorganization deci-
sions in four discrete sections of Subchapter IV: § 1165, requiring that
“the court and the trustee shall consider the public interest in addition to
the interests of the debtor, creditors, and equity security holders” in apply-
ing other sections regarding railroad reorganizations; § 1169, requiring
that the court order the trustee to continue operation of a railroad line
subject to a rejected lease if operation by the lessor is “contrary to the
public interest;” § 1170, providing that “[t]he court . . . may authorize the
abandonment of . . . a railroad line if such abandonment is” among other
criteria, “consistent with the public interest;” and § 1173, providing that
the court will confirm a plan if, among other criteria, it is “consistent with
the public interest” and, if more than one plan meets all the applicable
criteria, requiring the court to confirm the plan that is “most likely to
maintain adequate rail service in the public interest.”212
The public interest provisions relating to railroad reorganizations
provide a compelling counterpoint to critiques of stakeholder-centric re-
form proposals.  The concept of bankruptcy law taking into account the
public interest is not a radical notion—at least in the particular arena of
railroad reorganizations, the law already expressly does so, and it has done
so for some time.  The long history of railroad reorganization cases con-
207. See id. at 491–92 (quoting Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Denver &
R.G.W.R. Co., 328 U.S. 495, 535–36 (1946)).
208. See id. at 506 (noting that “the Commission struck a balance between
public and private interests”).
209. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1161–1174 (2012).
210. See Veach, supra note 196, at 1222.  Trustees are required to be ap-
pointed in all railroad reorganization cases. See 11 U.S.C. § 1163.  The ICC, later
succeeded by the Surface Transportation Board, and other agencies retain the
right to appear and be heard in a railroad reorganization but have no right to
appeal. See id. § 1164.
211. For a discussion of the meaning of “public interest” in the context of
railroad bankruptcies, see Veach, supra note 196, at 1214.
212. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1165, 1169(b), 1170(a)(2), 1173(a)(4), 1173(a)–(b).
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firms that bankruptcy courts are capable of balancing various interests that
extend beyond those of a debtor and its creditors.  The applicability of
these provisions is obviously limited, and it could be maintained that it is
far easier to factor in a narrow conception of the public interest with re-
spect to the potential discontinuation of a railroad line than a general
notion of the public interest writ-large, or other stakeholders’ interests, in
non-railroad contexts.213  However, as argued by Karen Gross, if the pub-
lic interests associated with railroads are important enough to demand at-
tention, then why not the public interests associated with more modern
forms of transportation that affect communities, and then why not other
types of organizations that affect communities in different but equally im-
portant ways?214  While limited, the railroad reorganization provisions are
nevertheless an encouraging basis on which a more broadly applied recog-
nition of stakeholder rights could be built.
B. A Proposed Bankruptcy Regime for Benefit Corporations
Drawing from the examples of the Bankruptcy Code’s unique treat-
ment of nonprofits and railroads, this Section proposes a specific bank-
ruptcy regime for benefit corporations.  First, it will analyze the theoretical
justifications and challenges of applying the unique bankruptcy rules relat-
ing to nonprofits and railroads to benefit corporations.  Then, it will pro-
pose specific changes to the Bankruptcy Code and benefit corporation
statutes and analyze how such changes would apply to different social en-
terprise forms.
1. Applicability of Nonprofit and Railroad Bankruptcy Regimes to Benefit
Corporations
a. Applicability of Nonprofit Bankruptcy Regime
The bankruptcy law of nonprofits is a natural starting place in crafting
a bankruptcy law of benefit corporations.  Given the hybrid nature of ben-
efit corporations, their treatment should arguably fall somewhere on the
spectrum between the treatment of nonprofits and the treatment of for-
profits.215  The key distinctions between nonprofit and for-profit bank-
ruptcy rules can be grouped into two categories.  The first, the rules that
exempt nonprofits from the prospect of involuntary bankruptcies or invol-
untary conversions from a reorganization to a liquidation proceeding, will
be referred to as the “Involuntary Proceeding Exemption.”  The second,
the rules that subject transfers of property of a nonprofit debtor to appli-
cable restrictions under state or other law, will be referred to as the “Non-
Bankruptcy Law Disposition Provisions.”
213. See infra Section V.B.1.c for further discussion of the challenges of apply-
ing the railroad approach to benefit corporations.
214. See GROSS, supra note 125, at 220–21.
215. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
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Application of the Involuntary Proceeding Exemption to benefit cor-
porations risks encouraging the abuse of the benefit corporation form.  A
key distinction between a for-profit, including a benefit corporation, on
the one hand, and a nonprofit, on the other hand, is that “[a] non-
profit . . . is prohibited from net earnings” to shareholders or other private
owners, a feature referred to in academic literature as the “nondistribu-
tion constraint.”216  In addition, nonprofits are subject to additional re-
porting requirements and a host of other restrictions that are not
applicable to most for-profit organizations.  Yet nonprofits also enjoy sig-
nificant benefits, including exemption by application from income and
other taxes, the ability to receive donations that are tax-deductible for
their donors in certain cases, and the Involuntary Proceeding Exemp-
tion.217  If these benefits were available to for-profits, founders of an or-
ganization may be unlikely to choose the nonprofit form and the
additional restrictions that come with it.  A few academics and practition-
ers have called for the tax benefits applicable to nonprofits to be extended
to hybrid social enterprise forms.218  Others have persuasively argued
against this proposal, in part on the basis that the flexibility of social enter-
prise forms would cause “difficulty in ensuring that [such entities] in fact
provide meaningful public benefit” as compared to nonprofits.219  Social
enterprise forms are therefore far more susceptible to being taken advan-
tage of by opportunists who wish to “take the tax benefits and leave the
public benefit behind.”220  Similar risks apply to extending the Involun-
tary Proceeding Exemption to benefit corporations.  An entrepreneur
216. See Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations
from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 56–57 (1981).  The term “nondis-
tribution constraint” is an academic term that broadly describes certain restrictions
applicable to organizations that are tax exempt under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code.  For simplicity, the use of the term “nonprofit” in this section refers
to a firm organized as a nonprofit that is also exempt from federal taxation under
§ 501(c)(3).  As noted in Section V.A.1.a, the term used by the Bankruptcy Code
does not correspond precisely to this definition, but for purposes hereof is as-
sumed to refer to an organization that is subject to the nondistribution constraint.
217. For a description of the advantages enjoyed by nonprofits, see Anup
Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for for-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 2017, 2026 &
n.22 (2007).
218. See, e.g., id., at 2022 (advocating “decoupling” of tax exemption from
nonprofit form); Bob Solomon, The Fall (and Rise?) of Community Banking: The Con-
tinued Importance of Local Institutions, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 945, 979 (2012) (arguing
nonperforming investments in community development financial institutions
should be tax deductible); Thomas J. Billitteri, Mixing Mission and Business: Does
Social Enterprise Need a New Legal Approach, ASPEN INST. 6 (Jan. 2007), https://as
sets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/files/content/docs/pubs/New_Legal_
Forms_Report_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/C537-KUK7] (reporting on Aspen
Institute-convened conference where “many participants . . . . advocated such steps
as changing the federal tax code to accommodate new kinds of social enterprise
vehicles”).
219. See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Joseph R. Ganahl, Taxing Social Enterprise, 66
STAN. L. REV. 387, 436–38 (2014).
220. See id. at 438.
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could choose the benefit corporation form to take advantage of ancillary
benefits like the Involuntary Proceeding Exemption if such benefits in-
creased the prospects of pecuniary gain enough to offset any decrease in
pecuniary gain stemming from stakeholder-benefitting provisions.  How-
ever, it is difficult to imagine the same with respect to the nonprofit form,
given the nondistribution constraint and other trade-offs associated with
nonprofit regulation.
The same concern does not hold for extending the Non-Bankruptcy
Law Disposition Provisions to benefit corporations.  An application of this
concept to benefit corporations would result in respecting state law restric-
tions on transfers of the firm’s assets occurring outside of bankruptcy in-
side of bankruptcy.  In other words, if state law requires that the ownership
of a benefit corporation or its assets cannot be transferred to a new party
without considering the impact of such transfer on various stakeholders,
then the same would be true in a bankruptcy proceeding.  Such a rule is
consistent with the purpose of a benefit corporation.  As discussed in Sec-
tion III.B, an investor who cares about the impact of a corporation’s ac-
tions on stakeholders outside of bankruptcy should care about it in the
context of bankruptcy, as well.  The rule would not be an ancillary benefit
of choosing the public interest and stakeholder provisions embodied by
the benefit corporation form.  Rather, it would be an extension of these
provisions.  It is difficult to imagine any profiteering to be had by the ex-
tension of such provisions into bankruptcy.  If anything, it would decrease
the prospect of returns for equity holders by reducing recoveries for credi-
tors and thereby decreasing the likelihood of any surplus value remaining
for equity.
b. Applicability of Railroad Bankruptcy Regime
The public interest mandates of the Bankruptcy Code’s railroad reor-
ganization provisions provide an instructive model for crafting benefit cor-
poration bankruptcy rules that depart from the nonprofit model.  The
Non-Bankruptcy Law Disposition Provisions, by ensuring that nonprofit
transfers in bankruptcy take into account state law public interest consid-
erations, effectively give influence to state attorney generals authorized to
regulate charitable organizations on behalf of the general public.221  Rail-
road bankruptcy laws used to bestow the ICC with the authority to speak
for the public interest.  That role has since been passed to the bankruptcy
court, which is tasked with determining and weighing the public interest
in railroad reorganization decisions.222  Benefit corporations, unlike char-
itable nonprofits, are not subject to regulation by a governmental agency
that speaks for the public interest or the interests of particular, identified
stakeholders.  The current railroad reorganization approach of assigning
221. See supra notes 190–92 and accompanying text.
222. The trustee in a railroad reorganization, as the representative of the
debtor’s estate, is also tasked with this role. See supra Section V.A.2.b.
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that role to the bankruptcy court offers a useful alternative where there is
no obvious third party to be assigned with such a role.
c. Challenges of Applying Nonprofit and Railroad Bankruptcy Regimes
to Benefit Corporation
In considering the applicability of the nonprofit and railroad bank-
ruptcy approaches, a key distinguishing factor for benefit corporations is
the relative weakness of their accountability mechanisms and the open-
ended nature of the stakeholder interests protected under benefit corpo-
ration statutes.  Nonprofits are subject to robust regulatory regimes de-
signed “to ensure that they in fact pursue public benefit.”223  Railroads are
not subject to similar accountability mechanisms, but, by their very nature,
provide a service that courts have long viewed as vital to the public inter-
est.224  To the extent that public interests are given special consideration
in the bankruptcy of a nonprofit or a railroad, there is a strong basis for
presuming that those same interests were served by the debtor prior to
bankruptcy—whether due to the strict accountability mechanisms of the
nonprofit regulatory regime or due to the nature of the services that rail-
roads provide.
Benefit corporations, on the other hand, are subject to weak account-
ability mechanisms.  In the absence of any direct regulatory oversight, the
principal means of accountability under the MBCL are reporting require-
ments as to a benefit corporation’s social and environmental performance
and the availability of derivative “benefit enforcement proceedings.”225
However, the required reporting is neither standardized nor tied to any
particular benchmark, and unless otherwise elected in a charter, benefit
enforcement proceedings cannot be brought by non-stockholder stake-
holders, leaving such stakeholders with, at best, non-legal means of hold-
ing benefit corporations accountable.226  Further, the public interests
223. See Mayer & Ganahl, supra note 219, at 392, 433 (“Various, primarily fed-
eral, tax rules—e.g., UBIT, penalties for excess benefit transactions, and the threat
of the loss of exemption—as well as the supervisory role usually given to state attor-
neys general, grant authority to public representatives to keep charities faithful in
their service of public interests.” (citing John Tyler, Negating the Legal Problem of
Having “Two Masters”: A Framework for L3C Fiduciary Duties and Accountability, 35 VT.
L. REV. 117, 150–51 (2010))).
224. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
225. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION §§ 102, 305 (B LAB 2016).
226. For an in-depth discussion of the challenges of accountability for benefit
corporations, see Alicia E. Plerhoples, New Directions in Community Lawyering, Social
Entrepreneurship, and Dispute Resolution: Social Enterprise as Commitment: A Roadmap,
48 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 89, 134 (2015) (“Because non-stockholder stakeholders
cannot bring a derivate suit against a hybrid corporation, they lack direct accounta-
bility . . . Indirect accountability is the ability to influence or shape the corpora-
tion’s action or behavior through less formal means and is derived from non-legal
sources such as public shaming or negative publicity from media and third-party
watchdogs . . . .”); see also Mayer & Ganahl, supra note 219, at 432–36 (“[C]urrent
hybrid statutes do not address the issue of how charitable is charitable enough, nor
does it appear desirable for them to do so.”).
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purported to be served by benefit corporations are significantly broader
than the public interest referred to in the context of railroads and may
have no obvious connection to the benefit corporation’s line of busi-
ness.227  An indiscriminate application of the nonprofit or railroad bank-
ruptcy approach to benefit corporations therefore risks allocating more
value to the stakeholder interests associated with the benefit corporation
form than is warranted by a debtor’s actual pre-bankruptcy behavior.
2. Proposed Changes to Existing Law
a. Proposed Changes to the Bankruptcy Code
As in the case of nonprofits, bankruptcy law should respect state law
considerations as to the disposition of the property and ownership of ben-
efit corporations.  However, taking the same approach as the Non-Bank-
ruptcy Law Disposition Provisions applicable to nonprofit property
transfers would not be entirely effective.  Unlike the law of nonprofits in
most states, benefit corporation statutes do not subject transfers to objec-
tive limitations or the approval of a third party arbiter.  Rather, benefit
corporation statutes regulate transfers indirectly through the mandate for
directors to consider stakeholder interests in making all decisions and di-
rectly, at least with respect to transfers of substantially all assets, through a
requirement for approval by a two-thirds majority of the shareholders.  As
a result, a provision simply stating that transfers of property in bankruptcy
must be made in accordance with non-bankruptcy law risks being both too
narrow and too broad: too narrow in that stakeholder considerations
would be recognized only in situations where the directors of the debtor
remain involved in decision-making, and too broad in that the two-thirds
shareholder vote would arguably be required in all situations, even for
plans proposed by a creditor that would not otherwise need to be con-
sented to by the debtor.228
Instead, the Bankruptcy Code should recognize the stakeholder con-
siderations embedded in benefit corporation statutes by expressly requir-
ing both the debtor or trustee and the court to take such interests into
account.229  This mirrors the railroad approach.  Rather than establishing
a single standard of considering the public interest, however, it would rec-
ognize that benefit corporations have heterogeneous standards for which
227. Under the MBCL, all benefit corporations are required to have a pur-
pose of creating a “general public benefit,” defined as “a material positive impact
on society and the environment, taken as a whole, assessed against a third-party
standard, from the business and operations of a benefit corporation.” See MODEL
BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION §§ 102, 201(a).  The MBCL also permits specific public
benefits as purposes which are in addition to the “general public benefit” purpose.
See id. § 201(b).
228. This would leave out any plan of confirmation proposed by a creditor
and not consented to by the debtor, as well as any proceedings where a trustee is
appointed to manage a debtor’s estate.
229. This approach would depend on whether the debtor’s estate is managed
by the debtor-in-possession or by an appointed trustee.
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stakeholder interests are represented.  The bankruptcy court would have
to consider applicable state legislation and the charter of a given benefit
corporation, and it would defer to those standards however they may be
articulated on a case-by-case basis.  Following the language of § 1165 re-
garding railroads, this could be accomplished with a provision stating that
in a case involving a benefit corporation, unless otherwise expressly pro-
vided in the benefit corporation’s charter,230 the court and the trustee or
debtor shall consider “Stakeholder Interests” in addition to the interests of
the debtor, creditors, and equity security holders when applying the sec-
tions of the Bankruptcy Code regarding reorganization, sales of assets, and
conversion of a Chapter 11 case to a Chapter 7 case.231  Stakeholder Inter-
ests would be defined as all interests that a director of a benefit corpora-
tion is required to consider in discharging his or her duties pursuant to
state law and the benefit corporation’s charter documents.232
230. Such a qualification is necessary for the rule to operate as a default rule.
231. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 363, 1112, 1129 (2012).
232. While the rule proposed in this Section accounts for non-creditor inter-
ests in a manner that may reduce creditor returns, it does not follow that such a
rule is inconsistent with the absolute priority rule, which prohibits holders of any
junior “claim or interest” from receiving payment under a plan of reorganization
until all higher-ranking classes are repaid in full. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B).
“Interest” in this context is generally understood to mean “equity interest.” See,
e.g., In re Wabash Valley Power Ass’n, Inc. (Wabash II), 72 F.3d 1305, 1313 (7th Cir.
1995) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)).  In nonprofit bankruptcies, courts have grap-
pled with how the rule may apply to plans that would allow directors, managers, or
members to retain control of the debtor or “which appear to allocate going con-
cern value of the nonprofit to pre-petition interest holders or the nonprofit itself.”
See Pamela Foohey, Chapter 11 Reorganization and the Fair and Equitable Standard:
How the Absolute Priority Rule Applies to All Nonprofit Entities, 86 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 31,
36 (2012).  Generally, courts have found the absolute priority rule to be “inapplica-
ble to nonprofits” on the basis that they typically “do not have ‘owners’ who hold
‘equity interests[,]’” with “a fact-specific analysis” where a party retains an interest
resembling equity. See id. at 37.  Similarly, in the context of railroad bankruptcies,
the public interest protected by the railroad reorganization provisions clearly is
not comparable to an equity interest.  The promotion of such public interest and
adherence to the absolute priority rule are implicitly compatible goals under the
Bankruptcy Code because confirmation of any railroad plan of reorganization re-
quires both that the plan be consistent with the public interest and that it comply
with the entirety of 11 U.S.C. § 1129. See 11 U.S.C. § 1173(a)(1) (2012).  Under
the rule proposed in this Section, the holders of Stakeholder Interests do not re-
semble equity holders nor do they hold claims against a debtor’s estate entitled to
payment.  The requirement of taking into account Stakeholder Interests, similar to
the requirement to take into account the public interest in railroad bankruptcies,
potentially results in outcomes that benefit such interests at the expense of lower
overall returns for creditors.  But the rule does not require that the property of the
estate actually be distributed to the holders of such interests, and in fact, such
interests may not even have identifiable holders in the case of interests like the
environment and community and societal factors.  Once a plan, asset sale, or simi-
lar event is approved, duly taking into account its effects on such interests, the
claims of creditors would remain the first claims entitled to payment from a distri-
bution of property of the estate.
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Finally, in order to account for the weak accountability mechanisms
of benefit corporation statutes and the open-ended nature of the public
benefits they espouse, such language should be qualified so as to recog-
nize the degree to which a benefit corporation’s Stakeholder Interests
were actually served prior to filing for bankruptcy.  For example, the
MBCL requires directors of any benefit corporation to consider the effects
of actions on “the local and global environment.”233  However, there may
be wide discrepancies in the extent to which benefit corporations actually
devote resources to doing so.  Ideally, the legal standard would not give
the same weight to environmental considerations in the case of, on the
one hand, a company that exhibited a long and proven commitment to
environmentally sound business practices prior to bankruptcy and, on the
other hand, a company that elected the benefit corporation form for en-
tirely different reasons and showed little interest in environmental consid-
erations in practice.  A solution would be to tie the weighing of
stakeholder interests to corporate behavior exhibited prior to filing.  Al-
though imperfect, the third-party annual benefit reports required under
the MBCL provide a readily available proxy.234  The language proposed
above requiring that the court and the trustee or debtor consider Stake-
holder Interests could therefore be qualified with language providing that
those interests must be observed only to the extent that they were ob-
served by the debtor prior to the filing of the petition, as evidenced by the
debtor’s statutorily-required third party reports.
b. Proposed Changes to Benefit Corporation Statutes
Even with the above changes to the Bankruptcy Code, a benefit cor-
poration director’s duties as they are expressed by existing benefit corpo-
ration statutes would still conflict with its duties as they are understood in
the context of a bankruptcy.  As noted in Section III.A, benefit corpora-
tion statutes exclude creditors from the list of stakeholders whose interests
must be considered by directors.  Thus, a director of a bankrupt benefit
corporation would still face the dilemma of navigating two legal standards
that, taken at face value, appear to be in conflict: a bankruptcy regime that
requires considering non-stakeholder interests along with the interests of
creditors, and a state law regime that requires considering the interests of
a defined group of stakeholders excluding creditors.  Therefore, as sug-
gested by Schildhorn and Keilson, benefit corporation statutes should in-
233. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 301(a)(1)(v) (B LAB 2016).
234. As discussed in the text accompanying notes 225–27, the reporting re-
quirements of the MBCL are a weak mechanism for accountability due to the lack
of standardization or common benchmark and the inability of non-shareholder
stakeholders to directly hold benefit corporations accountable for deficiencies
cited in such reports.  But while insufficient as a means of accountability, such
reports could nevertheless provide a useful evidentiary record of all of a benefit
corporation’s pre-bankruptcy efforts regarding social and environmental perform-
ance, including by indicating any focus on a particular subset of stakeholders.
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clude a provision to the effect that upon insolvency, creditors are included
in the list of parties whose interests must be taken into account by a bene-
fit corporation and its directors.235  Even without such an amendment a
court could potentially reach the same conclusion and hold that creditors
of an insolvent corporation surely must be considered stakeholders even if
not called out by statute.  Such a change, however, would eliminate ambi-
guity and potential liability concerns by clearly harmonizing the two
standards.236
c. Applying Proposed Regime to Different Social Enterprise Legal
Forms
As discussed in Section II.D, benefit corporation statutes and related
social enterprise statutes are not uniform.  The stakeholder interests that a
bankruptcy court would be required to consider pursuant to the regime
proposed above could vary significantly in degree of specificity based on
the applicable statute and the applicable purposes that a social enterprise
elects to adopt.  A benefit corporation under the MBCL may choose to
have as its purpose only the general public benefit (i.e., a material positive
impact on society and the environment), with directors required to take
into account the interests of a generically broad range of stakeholders.237
In contrast, a public benefit corporation may choose to have only “a spe-
cific public benefit” as its purpose, for example to “[p]romote medical
and health sciences education,”238 with directors required to balance that
specific interest against pecuniary interests “and the interests of those ma-
terially affected by the corporation’s conduct.”239  A social purpose corpo-
ration could have one or more of a limited menu of broadly defined social
purposes, with directors given discretion in weighing such purposes
against other factors, including the best interests of the corporation and
its shareholders.240  Finally, a benefit corporation or a public benefit cor-
235. Schildhorn and Keilson propose such a change to benefit corporation
statutes as a way of resolving the conflict with traditionally understood fiduciary
duties of directors of insolvent corporations. See Schildhorn & Keilson, supra note
73, at 86.  However, they do not propose an accompanying change to the Bank-
ruptcy Code. See id.  This leaves open the question of how a bankruptcy court
would apply such a provision in administering cases and whether it would actually
require a court to balance the same non-creditor and creditor interests.
236. Hypothetically, as an alternative, the Bankruptcy Code standard could
simply mirror the standard contained in existing benefit corporation statutes,
thereby not recognizing the interests of creditors at all.  However, this would lead
to a nonsensical result in the application of bankruptcy law.
237. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. Legislation § 201 (B LAB 2016).
238. See Alicia E. Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations 90 Days out:
Who’s Opting In?, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 247, 254, 271 n.122 (2014) (citing
Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation of Arist Medical Sciences Uni-
versity, Inc., filed with State of Del., Sec’y of State (Aug. 12, 2013, 1:01 PM)).
239. See id. at 256; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362 (West 2016).
240. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 2700(c) (West 2016).
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poration may choose to adopt both a broad general public benefit and a
specific public benefit.241
The different social enterprise models present different challenges to
the success of a social enterprise bankruptcy regime.  Specific public bene-
fits require bankruptcy courts to weigh entirely distinct types of interests
against creditor wealth maximization on a case-by-case basis.  For example,
a corporation with a stated purpose of providing living wages in a low-
income community and a corporation with a stated purpose of bettering
the environment by selling biodegradable footwear present significantly
distinct considerations for a court weighing public benefit considerations
against creditor wealth maximization.  By contrast, a court applying the
railroad reorganization provisions has the benefit of precedents that ex-
amined a single issue: how to weigh the public interest associated with
maintaining railroad service against creditor wealth maximization.  This
presents courts with a challenge, but it is not an unprecedented one.
Charitable nonprofits can have a wide range of specific purposes that fall
within broader categories of permitted purposes.  Under the BAPCPA,
courts are required to respect state law restrictions that promote preserva-
tion of those purposes, which could lead to significantly different consid-
erations for different nonprofits.
A benefit corporation with a purpose only of promoting the general
public benefit presents a different challenge in that its purpose is so broad
and its stakeholders so diffuse that it may be difficult to weigh their inter-
ests against the interests of creditors tangibly.  Critics have argued that the
MBCL’s general public benefit provision and mandate to take into ac-
count the interests of a broad range of stakeholders are too vague, leaving
directors with little practical guidance as to how to prioritize the “interests
of various constituencies” and potentially inhibiting their ability to pursue
legitimate specific social objectives. In the absence of more specific gui-
dance, directors may simply fall back on prioritizing shareholder wealth
maximization.242  Similar issues could apply in a bankruptcy proceeding.
For example, in assessing competing plans of reorganization for a benefit
corporation having only a general public benefit purpose, how should a
court compare a plan that is better for employees to a plan that is better
for customers, when both groups are statutorily enumerated stakeholders?
Facing such questions, a court would more likely default to creditor wealth
maximization when the countervailing stakeholder interests are broad and
vague rather than specifically defined.  These challenges could be miti-
gated, however, by the rule proposed above that stakeholder interests
should be observed in bankruptcy only to the extent they were actually
observed pre-bankruptcy.
241. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
242. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 1, at 29–33; see also Callison, supra note 155,
at 107–09.
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As long as there is heterogeneity in social enterprise forms, as well as
flexibility under given forms to pursue a range of social objectives and
pursue such objectives with varying degrees of commitment, there will in-
evitably be heterogeneity in the application of a social enterprise bank-
ruptcy regime.  The flexibility of the public benefit corporation and social
purpose corporation statutory approach and the breadth of the MBCL
statutory approach present distinct challenges that would likely result in
significantly different applications of the standard proposed herein.  Nev-
ertheless, for all forms, the bankruptcy regime proposed in this Article is
more likely to produce outcomes that are aligned with the considerations
driving social enterprise legislation than a regime that ignores those con-
siderations altogether.
C. Efficiency of Benefit Corporation Bankruptcy Proposal
1. Simplified Law and Economics Model of Bankruptcy
The unique bankruptcy treatment of benefit corporations proposed
herein presents a lower expected value of return for creditors in bank-
ruptcy.  It may not always result in different outcomes from those of a
traditional bankruptcy system, but when it does, the outcomes will take
into account non-creditor interests to a greater extent and, therefore, pro-
vide lower returns to creditors.  In a straightforward law and economics
view of bankruptcy, such a system should be expected to have the ex ante
effect of decreasing overall economic efficiency.  Lenders would demand a
higher rate of interest to compensate for their lower expected return in a
downside scenario, and consequently, benefit corporations would face a
higher cost of debt capital.243  As a result, benefit corporations would be
required to devote resources to servicing debt that may be more profitably
used elsewhere.  Ultimately, this results in decreased productive economic
activity and, therefore, lower overall social wealth.244
243. However, creditor demand for socially responsible debt investments may
mute or even eliminate this effect.  Regardless of whether the motivation is genu-
inely “doing good” or the superficial positive public relations effects associated
with what is perceived to be responsible lending, there is a real demand for debt
investments seen as socially responsible.  Fixed income constitutes a growing por-
tion of the “sustainable investing” market, a market that “[b]y one estimate” com-
prised of “$21.4 trillion of global assets under management . . . in 2014.” See J.P.
MORGAN PRIVATE BANK, DECODING THE ELEMENTS OF SUSTAINABLE INVESTING,
https://am.jpmorgan.com/blob-pbstudio/1383335319956/83456/sustainable-in
vesting-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3E4-ZXB9] (last visited Feb. 22, 2017).  For
the same reasons that certain equity investors are willing to trade off some degree
of shareholder wealth maximization in exchange for in-kind returns associated
with investing in a benefit corporation, there are likely creditors willing to trade off
some degree of expected financial return in exchange for in-kind returns associ-
ated with lending to a benefit corporation.  This dynamic may not fully offset the
countervailing lower expected financial return, but it may mitigate the increase in
debt costs that would otherwise be expected under the proposed regime.
244. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 106, at 1814 (“To summarize, in the eco-
nomic view, the ultimate object of bankruptcy law is to help maximize social
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2. Benefit Corporations as Instruments for Efficiently Addressing Externalities
This analysis changes if the benefit corporation form is viewed as a
contract between directors and shareholders who wish to receive both a
monetary return and an “in-kind” return associated with reducing the neg-
ative externalities, and increasing the positive externalities, of the firm’s
behavior.  This view is illustrated by a hypothetical comparing the decision
making of a firm that is purely profit-maximizing to that of a firm that
chooses non-profit-maximizing outcomes due to societal considerations
under certain circumstances.
Suppose a manufacturing firm has the option of producing its sole
product using two alternative methods.  The annual operating expenses
associated with Method A equal $100, the annual operating expenses asso-
ciated with Method B equal $200, and both methods produce the exact
same product resulting in annual gross revenues of $400.  Method A, how-
ever, results in environmental pollution with an annual societal cost of
$600, while Method B does not.  Suppose further that this pollution is not
legally prohibited and does not otherwise affect the firm’s operations be-
cause of negative publicity or other factors.  If the firm is purely profit-
maximizing, it will choose Method A, resulting in an annual net profit of
$300 rather than $200.  This result is a classic market failure.  Because the
firm is not legally or otherwise induced to internalize the cost of the nega-
tive externalities produced by its activity, it operates inefficiently when tak-
ing into account all costs of its behavior, decreasing overall societal wealth.
However, if the firm is not entirely profit-maximizing, but rather its
equity investors are willing to realize less profit in exchange for producing
positive societal effects or eliminating negative societal effects, the result
may be different.  Equity investors in a benefit corporation who expect its
stakeholder provisions not to be completely superfluous—in other words,
who expect that on some occasions the corporation may take actions that
are not purely profit-maximizing on account of societal considerations—
must be willing to forego some amount of profit in exchange for those
societal considerations being taken into account.  Otherwise, they would
invest in purely profit-maximizing firms.  Whatever their underlying moti-
vation, investors are willing to pay some amount for the firm to decrease
negative externalities and increase positive externalities on stakeholders.
Adopting a property model in which a benefit corporation’s stakeholder
provisions exist to serve the partially non-profit-maximizing preferences of
its shareholders and the benefit corporation’s directors function as agents
for the shareholders by taking into account those preferences, a benefit
corporation is more likely to reach efficient outcomes than a profit-maxi-
mizing firm, as is illustrated by returning to the above hypothetical.245
wealth.  This object implies the instrumental goal of minimizing the cost of debt
capital.  This instrumental goal, in turn, is facilitated by maximizing the creditors’
expected return when the firm is insolvent.”).
245. See text accompanying supra notes 70–71.
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Now suppose the aforementioned manufacturing firm is not purely
profit-maximizing, but rather is a benefit corporation whose equity hold-
ers consider protection of the environment to be a societal interest for
which they are potentially willing to forego a certain amount of share-
holder wealth.  Such shareholders will collectively be willing to pay, in the
form of reduced profits, an annual amount equal to G for the firm to not
engage in the environmentally harmful manufacturing method in ques-
tion.  If G is less than $100, the firm will choose Method A, as would a
purely profit-maximizing firm.  If G is above $100, the firm will choose
Method B, the more efficient outcome from the perspective of overall so-
cietal wealth.  Thus, assuming a world of perfect information in which in-
vestors do not pay more for an externality than the true societal cost or
benefit of such externality, a firm with investors valuing societal externali-
ties in addition to profit maximization will either produce the same out-
come or a more efficient outcome than a firm that is purely profit-
maximizing.246
3. Benefit Corporations as Instruments for Efficiently Addressing Externalities
in Bankruptcy
This model of a benefit corporation’s efficiency-maximizing behavior
functions the same way in the context of the benefit corporation bank-
ruptcy regime proposed in this Article.  The lower expected value of re-
turn for creditors in such a regime is passed on to the benefit corporation
in the form of a higher cost of debt financing.  But it does not follow that
this results in less overall efficiency.  Under the system proposed in this
Article, an investor in a benefit corporation who does not opt out of the
stakeholder-friendly bankruptcy regime implicitly places a value on pro-
ducing bankruptcy outcomes that are more stakeholder-friendly than
those produced under a traditional regime.  This investment implies that
the regime’s expected value to the investor is greater than the loss in
shareholder wealth resulting from the higher cost of debt financing.  If it
were not, the investor would not choose to invest in a firm subject to such
a regime.  Assuming that the investor is not paying more for such a system
than the true cost or benefit of the negative or positive externalities such a
system would in fact address, such a system should result in outcomes that
246. If shareholders are willing to pay more to prevent a negative externality,
or cause a positive externality, than the externality’s true societal cost or benefit,
an inefficient outcome could result.  In the above hypothetical, if the true societal
cost of the pollution is in fact $50 rather than $600, and G is $200, the firm will
choose Method B, an overall less efficient outcome.  Of course, in the real world of
imperfect information, socially-minded investors may overstate the true societal
value of externalities in certain circumstances.  However, an inefficient outcome
requires not just that the shareholders’ evaluation of an externality exceeds its true
value, but that the amount they are willing to pay to internalize it exceeds its true
value.  In a world of imperfect information, this is, of course, possible.  However,
an investor putting his or her own money on the line should be in as good a
position as anyone not to overvalue an externality.
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are either the same or more efficient from an overall societal wealth per-
spective than those of a traditional bankruptcy system.247
VI. CONCLUSION
Critics have persuasively argued that the aims of social enterprise leg-
islation could be achieved through more traditional legal frameworks.
Nevertheless, there is a large contingent of entrepreneurs and investors
who wish to eschew the perceived norm of shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion and pursue a socially conscious business model.  The benefit corpora-
tion and other social enterprise forms serve as convenient platforms for
them to do so.
But if the social enterprise legal movement is confined to qualifying a
rule of corporate governance that may not need qualification in any event,
it is a rather limited endeavor.  If such entrepreneurs and investors truly
wish to do business in a different way, they should widen the lens and
begin to consider other aspects of what it means to be a genuinely social
enterprise.  Considering the implications of financial distress—a time
when aspirational ideals of double and triple bottom lines clash with the
hard realities of business failure and creditor claims—is an important step
in that direction.  Hopefully, this Article’s proposals for a unique bank-
ruptcy regime for benefit corporations contribute to a discussion of social
enterprise that moves beyond the threshold corporate governance ques-
tions and explores the possibilities of just how different a “different way of
doing business” can be.
247. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
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